Občanská společnost podle Emmanuela Lévinase by Pštross, Mikuláš
UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE 
 
FAKULTA HUMANITNÍCH STUDIÍ 
 
Katedra studií občanské společnosti 
 
 
 
 
 
DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE 
 
Lévinasian Civil Society? 
 
Občanská společnost podle Emmanuela Lévinase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author / Autor: Bc. Mikuláš Pštross 
Diploma Thesis Adviser / Vedoucí diplomové práce:  
PhDr. Marek Skovajsa, Ph.D. 
Prague / Praha, 2010

  i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and 
literature listed in the appended bibliography. 
 
I give my consent to the publishing of this diploma thesis in the electronic library 
of the Faculty of Humanities in Prague and that it can be used as a study text. 
 
 
Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně a s použitím 
literatury uvedené v seznamu literatury. 
 
Souhlasím s tím, že tato diplomová práce může být zveřejněna v elektronické 
knihovně FHS UK a může být využita i jako studijní text. 
 
 
          ---------------------------------- 
Bc. Mikuláš Pštross 
 

  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to thank my thesis adviser, PhDr. Marek Skovajsa, Ph.D., for his kind 
help, professional advice, encouragement and great interest he has had in this thesis. 
 
I would also like to thank my family for their support, advice and help, especially 
to my wife Samantha and daughter Isabella, to my parents, Tomáš and Václava Pštross, 
and to my in-laws, Selim and Suzanne Trad. 
 
  iv 
English Abstract 
The goal of this thesis is to describe civil society by using the language of 
Emmanuel Lévinas’ philosophy. Lévinas himself never theorized this topic, but his 
description of the tension between ethics and politics provides a framework for such an 
effort. In his key books (Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than being) as well as his later 
essays and interviews conducted with him, Lévinas analyzes topics that are related to 
civil society: the third, justice, the State, the rights of man, and others. The key question 
of this diploma thesis is: What concept of civil society does Lévinas’ thought enable? 
Charles Taylor’s concept of civil society is used in this thesis as a starting point for 
developing a Lévinasian definition of civil society. 
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Český abstrakt 
Cílem této práce je popsat občanskou společnost pomocí pojmů filosofie 
Emmanuela Lévinase. Sám Lévinas o tématu občanské společnosti nikdy přímo nepsal, 
avšak jeho popis napětí mezi etikou a politikou poskytuje vhodný rámec pro takovéto 
uvažování. Ve svých hlavních dílech (Totalita a nekonečno, Jinak než být) a v pozdějších 
esejích a v rozhovorech se Lévinas věnuje tématům, která s občanskou společností 
souvisejí: třetí, spravedlnost, Stát, lidská práva, ad. Základní otázkou této diplomové 
práce je, jakou koncepci občanské společnosti umožňuje Lévinasovo myšlení. Práce 
využívá koncepci občanské společnosti podle Charlese Taylora jako výchozí bod pro 
vytvoření definice občanské společnosti podle Emmanuela Lévinase. 
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Author’s Note 
In this thesis I spell Lévinas’ name with diacritics over the letter ‘e’ unless 
quoting other authors or referring to titles in the bibliography that do not use such 
spelling. 
Lévinas’ terms the Other (the Others), the Same, the State and the Infinite (as in 
idea of the Infinite) have the first letter capitalized because of their specific meaning. In 
most of his works, Lévinas capitalizes the first letter himself. In the case of chapter 
names and English names of bibliographical sources, all initial letters are capitalized as 
well. 
When a new term by Lévinas is introduced in the thesis, it is put in italics; later 
uses of the term are not highlighted. If a term is surrounded by simple inverted commas, 
it means that it is not a special term used by Lévinas, but the meaning of the word is 
different than of the daily use. 
Quoted text is surrounded by inverted commas. It is in italics except for parts of 
the quote that were highlighted by its author. In such cases, the phrase ‘emphasis in the 
original text’ is used. Text in box brackets that is part of a quote was added in order to 
sustain the meaning of the quoted sentence. 
Lastly, while working on this thesis I used some primary and secondary literature 
that was in Czech. I kept the Czech titles of these sources but added their English name in 
box brackets. 
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Introduction 
This thesis attempts to philosophize together with Lévinas and perhaps even 
beyond his works. It raises the question: Could Lévinas’ philosophy provide viable 
foundations for a theory of civil society – a term whereof meaning is difficult to capture 
in the first place? It is likely that such adventure of the mind will yield more questions 
than it could provide answers and it is also possible that its goals will be missed. But isn’t 
that the meaning of philosophy: to lead us on an exploration behind the horizons of the 
clear and distinct? 
The tension between ethics and politics lies at the centerpiece of this thesis.1 
Lévinas is widely known as a philosopher who conducted a phenomenology of the face 
that signifies in the welcoming approach of ’one’s neighbor’ and imposes incumbent 
responsibility on the human Self. The Biblical commandment “Thou shall not kill“ 
(Exodus, 20: 13) resonates at the very moment of such encounter as a call for goodness 
and love. This is morality in the true sense, by which we are not duped, according to 
Lévinas.2 The face of the other signifies the very irreducibility of subjectivity. 
By emphasizing the value of human life, and by going against ontology, Lévinas’ 
philosophy has received the label ‘ethical.’ Less attention, however, has been paid to its 
social and political implications. For Lévinas, ethics has its counterpart in politics. Yet 
they are not opposites in the everyday sense like day is to the night. Ethics and politics 
describe two ‘modes’ of human existence, which is both blessed and limited by the fact 
that people form larger groups or societies.3 For example, in Totality and Infinity, Lévinas                                                         
1 According to Lévinas, in Western philosophy, ethics and politics have different sources. While politics is 
a Greek invention, ethics is the ‘philosophy‘ of the Hebrews. Lévinas also describes the tension between 
ethics and politics using pair-words like the saying – the said, Jerusalem – Athens, infinity – totality etc. 
(Simmons, 2003: 50). 
2 “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by 
morality.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 21). 
3 We can see a similarity between Lévinas‘ understanding of ethics and politics and Buber’s distinction of 
‘I-Thou’ and ‘I-It’ (‘Ich-Du’ and ‘Ich-Es’) and ‘Personality’ and ‘Individuality.’ The philosophical 
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dedicates both the Preface and the Conclusions to politics, thus surrounding his famous 
chapters on metaphysics by the notion of ontological war and ethical eschatological 
peace. Ethics and politics stand out as inter-connected. 
Together with Simmons, I believe the relationship between ethics and politics – 
which are otherwise in complete contradiction when taken to their extremes4 – can be 
described as ‘oscillation’.5 Societies have to be organized in a way that enables ethics to 
influence politics and vice versa. But the personal level should not be forgotten either. 
This especially applies to civil society. It would be incorrect to understand oscillation as a 
synthesis. This way civil society would be just a new term for totality.  
As will be shown later, civil society is instead understood as the domain in which 
citizens’ actions and institutions that are founded in order to ‘correct’ the State. For this 
reason special attention will be paid to Lévinas’ analysis of the State. The liberal State 
cannot be but democratic. “Listen, I am a democrat, what more would you like me to 
say?“ is Lévinas’ answer to the question of how his ethics are connected to political 
issues (Lévinas, 2001b: 195). However, I will try to philosophize one step further to think 
through the consequences that are aroused for the notion of civil society. 
In order to frame the discussion on Lévinasian civil society, I will interpret 
Charles Taylor’s concept of civil society, based on a reading of Taylor’s articles                                                         
background is, however different. In Buber’s book I and Thou, the relationship between two people is 
reciprocal; according to Lévinas there exists a separation between two people that cannot be breached. In 
the same way, ethics are not the same as the ’I-Thou’ and politics differ from ‘I-It.’ (Buber, 1969: 17; 
Lévinas 1996a: 68-69). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze the similarities and differences 
between the two thinkers. 
4 “I think that there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to 
the extreme.“ (Lévinas, 1989: 292). 
5 I am borrowing the term oscillation from William Simmons who refers to Susan Handelman’s book 
Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin. Scholem, and Levinas. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). Simmons claims that there is a continuing oscillation 
between ethics and politics in Lévinas’ philosophy. “The oscillating, but non-encompassing relationship 
between the saying and the said is extended to cover the relationships between philosophy and non-
philosophy, Hellenism and Judaism, and ethics and politics.“ (Simmons, 2003: 50). 
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“Invoking Civil Society” and “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” (Taylor, 1995: 
204-224, 257-287). It is not my intention to conduct a comparative study on its own, but 
to provide a stable starting point for theoretizing civil society with Lévinas.6 
 This thesis is divided into a bibliographical chapter (“Politics in the life of 
Emmanuel Lévinas”) followed by chapters on ethics (“The Idea of the Infinite“) and 
politics (“The Idea of the Third“). Such division is, of course, arbitrary and Lévinas 
himself has never forgotten to relate one to the other. In order to highlight the fact that the 
face of the Other who commands me to responsibility is one of many faces that are 
present alongside the neighbor approached, I have taken the liberty to introduce a new 
term: the idea of the third. It should serve as a tool to describe the waking up of one’s 
consciousness that leads to politics. Chapters I – III are followed by a synthesis of 
Lévinas’ understanding of the concepts of ethics and politics (chapters IV and V: “The 
Idea of the State“ and “The Idea of Civil Society“).7 
 
                                                        
6 A number of titles influenced the ideas presented in this thesis indirectly. This especially applies to books 
by Bernhard Casper, Catherine Chaliér and to Hegel’s description of civil society in The Philosophy of 
Right. These sources are listed in the bibliography without the quoting brackets. 
7 Lévinas himself speaks of the ‘idea of the State’ (Lévinas, 2001b: 68) so in this way I feel justified to 
follow suit; the implications of the interconnection between the state and civil society will also be described 
in chapter V (“The Idea of Civil Society“). 
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I. Philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas 
I.1. Politics in the Life of Emmanuel Lévinas 
Lévinas’ philosophy reflects the active and fruitful life this author had lived, as 
well as the sorrow and harm incurred to his family by National Socialism. Life events had 
many times confirmed Lévinas’ deep suspicion toward a certain way of thinking. For 
these reasons it is essential for this thesis to start with a bibliography that will bring the 
following chapters into a historical, social and cultural context. Lévinas speaks vividly 
and directly of his childhood and student years during his talks with François Poirié and 
other philosophers in the volume Is it Righteous To Be? This book of interviews will 
therefore be the main source of Lévinas’ bibliographical information. 
Lévinas’ family comes from the Lithuanian city of Kovno [Kaunas] where, 
compared to other places in the former Russian empire, Jews lived in a relatively 
peaceful environment. “The Jews lived in the old town of Kovno, but without feeling 
entrapped in a ghetto for all that.“ (Lévinas, 2001b: 188). Their spirituality was strongly 
influenced by the teachings of Elijah Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797) and his student Rabbi 
Hayyim Volozhiner (1759-1821). Opposed to Hasidism and Western cultural assimilation 
that were popular among Jews in other parts of Europe, Judaism of these two 
masterminds preserved its own authenticity through an intensive study of the Torah 
(Lévinas, 1989: 227-22, Lévinas, 2001b: 24).  
Lévinas was born on January 12, 1906.8 During his youth, he absorbed the 
atmosphere as well as the intellectual dialectic approach to the reading of the Holy books 
and commented on some of Rabbi Volozhiner’s works later in his life.9 But he also spoke 
Russian and admired writers like Pushkin, Gogol and Dostoevsky (Lévinas, 2001b: 24). 
                                                        
8 According to the Julian calendar, used in the former Russian Empire, Lévinas was born on December 30, 
1905. 
9 Especially in the two essays: “‘In the Image of God,‘ according to Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner“ (Lévinas, 
2007b: 148-163) and “Prayer without Demand“ (Lévinas, 1989: 227-234). 
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During World War I, Lévinas’ family moved to Kharkov in the Ukraine. After the 
war, upon his family’s return to Lithuania, Lévinas entered a Hebrew lyceum. In 1923 he 
moved to Strasbourg,10 where he met teachers who left an imprint on his mind. It was 
there that he was able to formulate his own political views. “I went to Maurice Pradines’s 
course on the relations between ethics and politics. And he offered the Dreyfus Affair11 as 
an example of the ethical overcoming the political.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 28-29). He also 
became acquainted with Maurice Blanchot and studied sociology and psychology under 
Charles Blondel and Maurice Halbwachs (Bergo, 2007). 
In 1928 Lévinas traveled to Freiburg to take courses from Edmund Husserl. 
Husserl taught him the phenomenological method, which inspired Lévinas’ key ethical 
concepts. Lévinas wrote his dissertation – his first book – on Husserl: in 1930 “The 
Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology“ was published. Yet it was also in 
Freiburg that Lévinas met Heidegger. “It was as if, to use the language of tourists, I went 
to see Husserl and I found Heidegger.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 32). The clarity of Heidegger’s 
arguments left quite an impression on Lévinas, yet he also sensed that the masterpiece 
Being and Time was sending an ambiguous message. At a seminar in the Swiss Davos in 
1929, which Lévinas attended as a student, Heidegger’s philosophy stood in sharp 
contrast against the thinking of Ernst Cassirer.12 “You know who he would join three 
years later: one would have to have had the gift of prophecy to sense this already at 
                                                        
10 “I chose France on account of the prestige of the French“ is Lévinas’ answer to François Poirié’s 
question why he had moved to Strasbourg. (Lévinas, 2001b: 28). 
11 A political scandal that divided public discussion in France, after a Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus was 
falsely accused of treason and imprisoned in 1894. Due to the intervention of leading intellectuals like 
Emile Zola, the case was reopened in 1899. Dreyfus was rehabilitated in 1906 and fought during World 
War I, but continued to be the target of hatred and resentment until his death in 1935. Accusations against 
him were driven by anti-semitic attitudes and some of his accusers later took part in the Vichy regime that 
openly collaborated with the Nazi in World War II (Caygill, 2002: 7-14; Wilkes, 1998). 
12 The seminar took place between March 17 and April 6, 1929 and for Lévinas was like a meeting of two 
worlds – the old one represented by Cassier and the new one represented by Heidegger (Bouretz, 2009: 
278-280). 
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Davos. I have thought for a long time – in the course of terrible years – that I had felt it 
then, in spite of my enthusiasm.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 35). 
It is no coincidence that Heidegger’s joining of the Nazi party in May of 1933 and 
his open endorsement of Hitler, was a sobering yet clear message to Lévinas that Western 
ontology could have extremely horrific implications. He summarized these thoughts in 
his 1934 essay “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” (Lévinas, 1990). This essay, 
whose ideas were more fully elaborated on in the Preface of Totality and Infinity 
(Lévinas, 1996a: Preface, 21-30), noticed in Nazism certain “elementary feelings” which 
came not from Hitlerians but instead were derivatives of the Western ontology as a whole 
(Lévinas, 1990: 64). According to Lévinas, an inherent danger lied in emphasizing of the 
bondage between the Self and the body, which was heralded by Heidegger (Dasein 
concerned with its own Being).13 The ideal society of biological unity (consanguinity) 
leads to creation of ‘races’ and to the propagation of a new ideal of truth. Lévinas 
finished off his careful analysis by claiming that such propagation directly leads to the 
practice of violence by the means of ideological expansion, endorsed by Germany at the 
time “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” was written. Racism was, according to 
Lévinas, a forced universalizing and equalization that lied in the very humanity of man 
(Lévinas, 1990: 71). 
In 1932 Lévinas married Raïssa Levi. Once World War II broke out, Lévinas was 
drafted by the French army and was captured by the Nazis in 1940. He spent the rest of 
the war in a prison camp, spared from deportation thanks to the Geneva Convention, 
which guaranteed protection to prisoners of war (Lévinas, 2001b: 40). It was there where 
he started writing the book Existence and the Existents.  
After the war Lévinas rejoined with his wife and daughter Simone who were 
hidden from the Nazis in the Convent in Saint-Vincent-de-Paul. He was shaken when he 
learned about the genocide committed by the Nazis on Jewish people including his own 
                                                        
13 Heidegger was not directly mentioned in Lévinas’ original text from 1934 but Lévinas talks about him in 
the introduction from March 1990 (Lévinas, 1990: 63). 
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family in Lithuania (Bouretz, 2009: 282).14 Together with other Jewish philosophers who 
survived the Nazi oppression, Lévinas raised in his books important ethical questions 
related to this event. “[T]he Holocaust is an event whose meaning remains 
inexhaustible.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 126). For Lévinas the whole of humanity suffered in the 
Nazi concentration camps.15 The suspicions presented in Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism proved to be true. “I tell myself that Auschwitz was committed by the 
civilization of transcendental idealism. And Hitler himself will be found again in 
Nietzsche.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 40). 
In 1947, two of Lévinas’ books were published: Existence and the Existents and 
Time and the Other; he closely collaborated on the latter work with Jean Wahl at the 
Collège Philosophique. That year Lévinas also became the director of the École Normale 
Israélite Orientale in Paris (until 1961) and through that institution was active in 
establishing Jewish schools across France. As pointed out by Hyam Maccoby, “Levinas 
was a practicing Jew, who, in the midst of intense philosophical activity, continually 
served the Jewish community.” (Maccoby, 1996). He closely followed the project of the 
Israeli State; in his commentaries he understood the Jewish State as a necessary condition 
for ethics, yet he was also critical to radical Zionism.16 
In 1954, Lévinas wrote the essay “The Ego and the Totality” where the concept of 
the Third was first outlined. This essay also paved the way for Lévinas’ key book Totality 
and Infinity that was published in 1961. Totality and Infinity brought about new ethical 
concepts and it distinguished between the Totality and Totalization, and ethics and the 
idea of the Infinite. While the warm acceptance of the face of the Other brings about 
                                                        
14 Lévinas dedicated Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence “[t]o the memory of those who were closest 
among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and to the millions on millions of all 
confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism.” (Lévinas, 
1998a: Introduction. Pagination not included). 
15 “The injustice committed against Israel during the war, that one calls the shoah – the passion of Israel in 
the sense in which one speaks of the passion of the Christ – is the moment when humanity began to bleed 
through the wounds of Israel.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 92). 
16 A more detailed description of this issue is presented in chapter IV of this thesis. 
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peace, politics – when taken to the extreme – lead to war. Also, in 1961 Lévinas started 
lecturing at the University of Poitier. 
One of the challenges Lévinas took on in his intellectual activities was to describe 
Jewish identity, in which his own life was rooted. “I have always thought of Jewish 
consciousness as an attentiveness which is kept alert by centuries of inhumanity and pays 
particular attention to what occasionally is human in man...“ (Lévinas, 1989: 290). He 
dedicated a number of books and essays to this topic: Difficult Freedom (1963), Quatres 
lectures talmudiques (1968),17 Of God Who Comes to Mind and Beyond the Verse (1982) 
and others. 
From 1967 on Lévinas started teaching at the University of Paris, Nanterre. While 
thinking through some criticism that followed the publishing of Totality and Infinity, 
especially from Derrida’s book Violence and Metaphysics, Lévinas reformulated his 
philosophy in two other books: Humanism of the Other (1972) and Otherwise than Being, 
or, Beyond Essence. According to Derrida, Lévinas’ break away with ontology was not 
complete, as he failed to abandon ontological terms. In order to strengthen his position 
Lévinas introduced terms like substitution, proximity, the saying and the said and others 
in Otherwise than Being. In regards to Derrida’s comments he claimed, “It is not always 
true that not-to-philosophize is still to philosophize.” (Lévinas, 1989: 238).18 
Lévinas later taught at the Sorbonne (1973-1979) and at the University of 
Fribourg in Switzerland. He gave lectures and wrote other books and essays: Proper 
Names (1976), Of God who Comes to Mind and Beyond the Verse (both 1982), 
“Transcendence and Intelligibility” (1984), Outside the Subject (1987), In the Time of 
Nations (1988), Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (1991), God, Death, and Time 
(1993) and Alterity and Transcendence (1995).  
                                                        
17 This volume and the book Du sacré au saint: cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques were translated into 
English by Annette Aronowicz under the title Nine Talmudic Readings (Levinas Online Bibliography, 
2009). 
18 On this matter, Simmons explains that for Lévinas, philosophy means ontology. That is also why he 
conducts metaphysics as non-ontological philosophy – or non-philosophy. (Simmons, 2003: 122). 
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Emmanuel Lévinas died at the age of 89 on December 25, 1995 in Paris. Two of 
his works were published for the first time posthumously: New Talmudic Readings 
(1996) and Éthique comme philosophie première (1998).19 
I.2. A Jewish Thinker? 
Lévinas’ commentators and interpreters claim that his philosophy is dialogic, as it 
analyzes the discourse between two people (see Poláková, 1995). In this aspect, Lévinas 
is being closely compared to Martin Buber. Moreover, Lévinas is often titled a ‘Jewish 
thinker’. In his works, Lévinas sometimes uses terms, which bear theological 
connotations. For example, in Totality and Infinity, the term religion is used by Lévinas 
to identify inter-personal relationships.20 In Otherwise and Being Lévinas speaks of 
‘God’ and ‘prophecy’ while presenting his understanding of the infinite command to 
responsibility (Lévinas, 1998a: 149-152). 
Though Lévinas strictly distinguished between his philosophical and religious 
books (Lévinas, 2001b: 62), he, never-the-less, referred to the Jewish tradition in his 
philosophy. In fact, his philosophy finds inspiration in both Greek and Hebrew. “In the 
European heritage that is ours, we must therefore not radically oppose the Judeo-
Christian and the Greek sources.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 183). Also, as Jill Robin’s pointed 
out, Lévinas “has a habit of responding to questions as if all answers were to be sought 
and found in the Hebrew Bible.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 15. Jill Robin’s Introduction). When 
he explains his key philosophical notions, he gives religious terms a new meaning.21 Can 
it therefore be said that Lévinas uses philosophy to defend his own religious beliefs? 
Together with Simmons, I claim that even though mutual inspiration between philosophy                                                         
19 As far as I know, this book has not been translated into English (Bergo, 2007). 
20 “We propose to call ‘religion‘ the bond that is established between the same and the other without 
constituting a totality.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 40). 
21 For example in the phrase, “Here am I in the name of God“, “The word God is still absent from the 
phrase in which God is for the first time involved in words. It does not at all state ‘I believe in God‘.“ 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 149). 
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and religion can be felt in Lévinas’ works, the two ‘worlds’ remain justified as 
autonomous (Simmons, 2003: 120-121). “[U]ltimately my point of departure is absolutely 
nontheological. I insist upon this. It is not theology that I am doing, but philosophy.” 
(Lévinas, 1996b: 30). 
Referring to the discussion on the difference between theology and philosophy, 
this thesis is complemented by Biblical citations, which introduce a few chapters. By 
quoting verses from the Old Testament that Lévinas used as illustrations for his 
philosophical texts, I want to allow the reader to look at the themes from another angle. 
While for Lévinas, Europe is the Bible and Greek philosophy (Lévinas, 2007a: 121), 
“The invisible of the Bible is the idea of the Good beyond being.“ (Lévinas, 2006a: 54). 
And of this beyond being is exactly what Lévinas wants to remind his readers.
 11 
II. Ethics – The Idea of the Infinite 
II.1. Ethics as the First Philosophy 
The Western philosophical tradition placed the question of quidditas [whatness] at 
its center. Asking ‘what’ something is, however, led to a creation of an abstract 
construction of what Heidegger identified as the ontological difference between entities 
and Being. According to this notion, entities – things perceived by the human 
consciousness, are embedded in Being qua entities. The question “What is...?“ denotes 
the essence of things and the role they play in the drama of Being. Greek philosophy, 
founded branches of science on the very premise that the system, in which entities reveal 
themselves to the human mind, can be captured in the logos. In other words, Western 
philosophy started as a pioneer expedition to the original principle – arché – of Being. 
According to Lévinas, the founding principle sought to encompass all entities in a 
totality. Projected against an ultimate goal of destiny, the individual lost its privilege – or 
face. 
Ontology is embedded in being inasmuch as the sovereign consciousness is 
grasping, analyzing and choosing between particular entities. “‘Totalization‘ may be 
understood to mean either the grouping of objects or of points in a whole, or the 
intellectual operation by which that multiplicity of objects or points is encompassed.“ 
(Lévinas, 1999: 39). This is the ‘Greek’ contribution to philosophy:22 starting with 
Parmenides and culminating in Heidegger’s phenomenology, the Western thought 
mastered the art of grasping. And it went even further from knowledge – the adequation 
of the grasping with the grasped – to power. “‘I think‘ comes down to ‘I can‘ – to an 
appropriation of what is, to an exploitation of reality.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 46). Lévinas 
claims that by this very approach philosophy confined reality within the boundaries of 
being; atrocities committed against innocent people in the 20th century were the very 
fruits of the ontological ‘harvesting’ of the Western thought. The ‘free man’, indifferent                                                         
22 “I think that Greek spirituality is first of all in knowledge” (Lévinas, 2001b: 116). “[Greek] is a language 
without prejudice, a way of speaking that bites reality without leaving any marks...“ (Lévinas, 2007a: 121). 
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to the cries of his victims and shielded against the transcendent light, accepted only one 
mission: to win the warfare against all. “War is the deed or the drama of the essence’s 
interest“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 4) and “ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power.” 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 46). 
And yet, peace is possible, but only if one person (the Same)23 submits his/her 
rights to another person (whom Lévinas calls the Other). Humanity in its Goodness is 
subjectivity – “the other in the same.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 25). Antecedent to the free 
consciousness (though not as a temporal event), a call for responsibility can be heard 
from the hither side of being. One is subjected to be the other person’s keeper. This, what 
Lévinas calls otherwise than being, shows its affinity with ethics. Ethics has no founding 
principle because it transcends the reality of being; it is an-archic (without an arché). 
In his philosophy, Lévinas reinterprets key moments in Western thought from this 
perspective and thus he defends something that has been lost and forgotten and only 
rarely evoked. “It is true that by certain traits the Greeks were capable of being 
‘biblical,’ if I dare say so.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 183).24 He endorses human subjectivity that 
reminds one of what is beyond being and is transcendental in its pure sense. Even though 
the human consciousness cannot fully capture it as a noema,25 a small gate opens in the 
world where the totality breaks up. “Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of 
                                                        
23 By using this term, Lévinas stays loyal to one of the key discussions of 20th century French philosophy – 
the difference between what is the same and what is other (Descombes, 2005). 
24 Lévinas specifically mentions Plato (“The beyond being, being’s other or the otherwise than being, here 
situated in diachrony, here expressed as infinity, has been made recognized as the Good by Plato.” 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 25). Also, Descartes’ end of the Third Meditation is an example of the moment when 
Western philosophy endorsed what transcends this world. “I think it proper to remain here for some time in 
the contemplation of God himself –that I may ponder at leisure his marvelous attributes – and behold, 
admire, and adore the beauty of this light so unspeakably great, as far, at least, as the strength of my mind, 
which is to some degree dazzled by the sight, will permit.“ (Descartes, 1996: Meditation III, §39). 
25 The founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, used the term noesis to describe human consciousness 
and noema (plural noemata) for individual objects of thought. Lévinas claims that the noesis/noema 
structure is not primary. (Lévinas, 1996a: 294, 122-127). 
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transcendence in the face of the Other.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 24). According to Lévinas – 
and this is his main point – not ontology but ethics is the first philosophy.26 
II.2. Living from…, Dwelling and Separation 
A discussion on ethics invokes the questions of Goodness. In order to explain this 
point, Lévinas first conducts in Totality and Infinity an analysis of one’s ‘economy of 
life’.27 The Self is ‘at home with itself’ in what Lévinas calls the dwelling, where things 
present themselves as objects of our use or implements. The dwelling is surrounded by a 
mass without a form: element. “[T]he element comes to us from nowhere; the side it 
presents to us does not determine an object, remains entirely anonymous. It is wind, 
earth, sea, sky, air.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 132). One ‘swims’ in the element (Lévinas, 1996a: 
131), yet such movement is unpredictable. The dwelling, however, provides a safe place 
for a retreat. Lévinas claims that the dwelling is an important precondition for someone to 
become responsible. One needs to have an ‘at home’ in order to be able to become one-
for-the-other; when the Same leaves behind the comforts of one’s dwelling in order to 
take responsibility for another person, transcendence penetrates the totality from the 
beyond being.28 This is Goodness, which is another word for giving, as in responsibility, 
one gives the world to the Other (Lévinas, 1996a: 252). 
Human life is, in essence, happy. “We live from ‘good soup,’ air, light, spectacles, 
work, ideas, sleep, etc… These are not objects or representations. We live from them.”                                                         
26 Lévinas’ answers to the question of what is most important in philosophy, is not always stated clearly. 
His thinking “[D]oes not fail to recognize being or treat it, ridiculously and pretentiously, with disdain.“ 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 16). Also, ethics taken to the extreme lead one to be in-different to the plurality of human 
society. Yet Lévinas also argues “The Good is above being.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 122) and only the ethical can 
to bring about peace and Goodness. 
27 Here the term economy relates to the Greek word OIKOS, which means house, household or farmstead 
that needs to be taken care of, and NOMOS – law o rule (Lévinas, 1997b: 26. Translator’s note). 
28 In this way the elementary situation that one is always at home with oneself (Alphonso Lingis’ translation 
of the French expression chez soi) – the naïve consciousness – is the starting point of Lévinas’ ethics. 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 33, 152-174). 
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(Lévinas, 1996a: 110). This is living from… which is different from the fact of life alone. 
Lévinas calls enjoyment the way our psyche perceives every sensing. “[E]njoyment is the 
singularization of an ego in its coiling back upon itself.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 73). What is 
important for him is that for enjoyment, intentionality has no knowledge of the sensed. In 
this sense, Lévinas turns around key notions of phenomenology. Husserl’s philosophy is 
based on the fact that ’objects‘ of everyday life are being represented in the mind – or 
consciousness. This is the intentionality of representation, which is the foundation of all 
knowledge.29 Inspired by though modifying this point, Lévinas claims, “The 
intentionality of enjoyment can be described by contrast with the intentionality of 
representation.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 127). Sensibility precedes thinking; it is the actual fact 
of enjoyment. While ‘knowing’ is a departure from the present, in enjoyment and 
vulnerability, sensations are felt as immediate and incumbent. This way, sensibility is the 
fact of one’s life, separated from the totality and therefore has a value of its own. 
Psychism or ‘inner life’ means separation (Lévinas, 1996a: 110). And life in its 
separation is egoistic.30 
Already in 1947 in Existence and Existent, Lévinas describes how the human 
subject detaches itself from the humming and buzzing of the There is [I ly a] in the act of 
hypostasis (interposition). This experience can be compared to sleeplessness: “The bare 
fact of presence is oppressive; one is held by being, held to be. One is detached from any 
object, any content, yet there is presence...” It is “[T]he universal fact of the there is, 
which encompasses things and consciousness.” (Lévinas, 2001a: 61). The Self is 
constituted as independent: “To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be 
derived from a system of references, to have identity as one’s content.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 
36). 
                                                        
29 According to Lévinas, the act of consciousness eventually becomes Sinngebung (giving of meaning), 
since consciousness, in order to grasp and make the world intelligible, attributes importance and meaning to 
various objects. (Lévinas, 1996a: 95). 
30 “We live in the consciousness of consciousness, but this consciousness of consciousness is not reflection. 
It is not knowing but enjoyment, and, as we shall say, the very egoism of life.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 112). 
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II.3. Interiority and Exteriority 
According to Lévinas, the Self is an interiority – it is primarily situated in its own 
inner life. “[I]nteriority is the refusal to be transformed into a pure loss figuring in an 
alien accounting system.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 56). But the tranquility of one’s interiority, its 
repose in its identity, as an ego, is only illusory; it is the “[B]ourgeois peace of the man 
who is at home with himself behind closed doors, rejecting the outside that negates him.” 
(Lévinas, 1996b: 165).31 
The detachment of the subject from Being takes on a new meaning with the 
responsibility one is called to take on for another person.32 This responsibility justifies the 
subject’s independence because only a subject that stands out as autonomous can be 
called to responsibility. In other words, Lévinas philosophizes of radical exteriority, 
which inflicts the ego from the outside. This is the core of Lévinasian ethics and is the 
starting point for discussions on politics as well. 
The movement outside or beyond is an inversion of interiority. Truth is not 
constituted thought but instead it comes from the exteriority. “Theory itself derives the 
exteriority of its terms from this movement, for the idea of exteriority which guides the 
quest for truth is possible only as the idea of Infinity.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 61). 
                                                        
31 Lévinas often uses the masculine gender as ‘generalizing‘ for both men and women. In direct quotes or 
when analyzing Lévinas’s key terms such as fraternity, I will use the nouns and pronouns in their 
generalizing form as well. But it should be noted that for Lévinas, fraternity also means ‘sorority‘ and when 
referring to the responsible subject it is both ‘him‘ and ‘her‘, ‘himself‘ and ‘herself‘ etc. 
32 “For the Being which we become aware of when the world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the 
sum total of persons and things; it is the fact that one is, the fact that there is.“ (Lévinas, 2001a: 8). 
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II.4. Alterity of Other 
According to Lévinas, the distance of separation between two autonomous 
subjects or Egos – two people – is absolute. Lévinas calls such separation atheism.33 The 
consciousness of the Same is unable to defy the alterity of the Other, who is an 
independent subject. In fact, all knowledge is an attempt to appropriate the Other.34  
And yet, led by what transcends the intelligible world – by what is exterior – is 
the Self drawn to the Other in Desire. Ethics start when the Same is called to leave 
behind its egoism and enjoyment in order to provide for the Other. Here Lévinas makes a 
crucial distinction between need and metaphysical Desire. Need belongs to the Same; it is 
a movement of the egoistic ego to provide for itself and to represent entities within the 
horizon of the intelligible world. In need, the Same swallows what is different from it in 
order to satisfy itself. What is different from the Same becomes part of it.  
Desire, on the other hand, calls the Same to leave its safe and comfortable 
dwelling and to approach the Other. Desire transcends the intelligible and it can never be 
fulfilled; “It is like goodness – the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.” (Lévinas, 
1996a: 34). Desire breaches the totality. In the essay “Transcendence and Height” 
Lévinas claims that the Other approaching opens the dimension of height (Lévinas, 
1996b: 12). This is another way of saying that between the relation between the Same and 
the Other is asymmetrical: the Other is always ‘above me’ in the ethical sense. 
                                                        
33 “One can call atheism this separation so complete that the separated being maintains itself in existence 
all by itself, without participating in the Being from which it is separated – eventually capable of adhering 
to it by belief.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 58). 
34 “Knowledge is a relation of the Same with the Other in which the Other is reduced to the Same and 
divested of its strangeness, in which thinking relates itself to the other but the other is no longer other as 
such; the other is already appropriated, already mine.“ (Lévinas, 1996b: 151. Emphasis in the original 
text).  
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II.5. The Idea of the Infinite 
The separation between the Same and the Other is only possible in transcendence. 
Desire is oriented as a movement towards what Lévinas calls the idea of the Infinite. The 
Self desires the idea of the Infinite, yet it cannot capture it as an object of representation 
because the Infinite makes itself ‘known’ from the beyond being. For this explanation 
Lévinas found inspiration in the Third Meditation where Descartes claims “[I]t is not to 
be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted [the idea of God] in me, that it might 
serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work.” (Descartes, 1996: 
Meditation III, §38). Lévinas speaks in a similar manner of the idea of the Infinite: it does 
not have its origin in the Same and it cannot be captured by consciousness. “No theme, no 
present, has a capacity for the infinite.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 146). This non-adequation of 
the Infinite with thought is illeity.35 
The insurmountable difference between the metaphysician and the idea of the 
Infinite founds the difference between the Same and the Other (Lévinas, 1996a: 50). The 
Ego cannot have complete and objective knowledge of the Other; transcendence resists 
all ‘fixation’ in representation (Lévinas, 1996a: 35). The separation between the Same 
and the Other inhibits the craving for power and instead leads to goodness, as bestowing 
the world to the Other. The Other can never become a theme. “The way in which the 
other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name the face.” 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 50. Emphasis in the original text). The movement outside occurs as the 
following of Desire towards exteriority – to the idea of the Infinite. The Other disrupts 
the Same as a surplus, to which exists no correlation in consciousness. The idea of the 
Infinite is “[T]he relation which binds the I to the Other.” (Lévinas, 1996b: 19). 
                                                        
35 “A neologism formed with il (he) or ille, it indicates a way of concerning me without entering into 
conjunction with me.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 12). 
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“Then the LORD asked Cain, "Where is your brother Abel?" He 
answered, "I do not know. Am I my brother's keeper?” (Genesis, 4:9) 
II.6. The Face and Responsibility 
The Other presents himself as a stranger, a widow and orphan in destitution.36 To 
emphasize the vulnerability and closeness of the Other who is approaching, Lévinas uses 
the term face. The face signifies itself – that is its intelligibility. As an expression, it 
exceeds its own form. Lévinas emphasizes that the face should not be thought of as a 
certain assembly of facial features or objects that can be seen, analyzed or grasped. Nor is 
it the way the Other is looking at me; even a human back can be expressive in this way.37 
“[The face] does not manifest itself by… qualities, but GAR AUTO. It expresses itself.” 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 51).38 The face signifies vulnerability as well as the call for 
responsibility, from which I can never excuse myself. “The face as the extreme 
precariousness of the other.” (Lévinas, 1996b: 167). I am infinitely responsible for my 
neighbor.39 “The more I answer, the more I am responsible.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 93). The 
responsibility is so vast that, in fact, I am responsible even for the Other’s own 
responsibility – even for the crimes he may commit (Lévinas, 1998b: 107). It precedes all 
free commitment: goodness is not a matter of choice (Lévinas, 1998a: 138).40                                                         
36 “[F]or my position as I consists in being able to respond to this essential destitution of the Other, finding 
resources for myself. The Other who dominates me in his transcendence is thus the stranger, the widow, 
and the orphan, to whom I am obligated.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 215. Emphasis in the original text). 
37 Lévinas takes this example from Vassili Grossman’s novel Life and Fate, where relatives of political 
detainees are waiting in a line to hear news about their beloved ones. All they can see are backs of the 
people ahead of them. (Lévinas, 1996b: 167). 
38 Lévinas’ use of the term GAR AUTO was inspired by Plato’s dialogue Phaedo. Lévinas explains that it 
“[Designates] an idea which, as the most true being, exists for an in itself.” (Lévinas, 1987: 20, footnote no. 
9). In other words, GAR AUTO means ‘on its own’ or ‘in its own terms’. 
39 “In this call to responsibility of the ego by the face that summons it, which demands it and claims it, the 
other [autrui] is the neighbor.“ (Lévinas, 1996b: 167). 
40 Lévinas also calls this non-freedom. (Lévinas, 1998a: 57). 
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The face imposes two obligations, which Lévinas takes from the Old Testament, 
but acknowledges their universal character even outside of religion: “Thou shalt not kill.“ 
Firstly, the face resists my power to bring about a complete negation of the Other. 
Ethically, murder is impossible, as the Other presents himself as the condition of peace 
and kindles my goodness and responsibility (Lévinas, 1996a: 199). The face opposes 
murder as a resistance, which is not violent but instead it is intelligible (Lévinas, 1987: 
19-22). Secondly, the commandment calls me not to leave the other person alone in his 
destitution. “If one thinks to the limit, one can say that I am responsible for the death of 
the other. I cannot leave him alone to die, even if I cannot stop it. This is how I have 
always interpreted the ‘Thou shalt not kill.‘“ (Lévinas, 2001b: 53). 
In an ethical relationship41 there exists mutual asymmetry between the person 
who is being approached and the Other, who expresses himself as a face. “Beings which 
present themselves to one another subordinate themselves to one another.” (Lévinas, 
1987: 21). In this point Lévinas disagrees with Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, who 
claims that the relationship between two people is reciprocal (Lévinas, 1996a: 68-69). 
According to Lévinas, the responsibility I am called to take for the Other can only be 
incumbent on me if the other is always ‘above me’ in an ethical sense and more important 
than me. Moreover, in responsibility, the originally selfish Ego becomes the-one-for-the-
other. Only when one lives and finds enjoyment from the living from a good soup, bread 
and other forms of nourishment, can one “Take the bread out of one’s own mouth, to 
nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 56). The-one-
for-the-other, who stops being the-one-for-itself, it therefore despite oneself in 
responsibility. This exposure to the Other is disinterestedness that is in fact pain. “Pain is 
a pure deficit, an increase of debt in a subject that does not have a hold on itself...“ 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 55). Because the-one-for-the-other is despite oneself, the human body                                                         
41 Lévinas is careful when using the term ‘relationship’ to describe the encounter of the Same by the Other. 
The term non-indifference better describes the meaning that is at stake. “I just barely allow myself to 
designate this as a ‘relation.’ I always put the word – when I remember to – in quotation marks, because 
‘relation’ rests on the ground of the ensemble. In the totality, there are ‘relations.’ I have an expression: 
non-indifference. In French I can say, I am non-indifferent to someone. The double negation in “non-
indifference” signifies difference.“ (Lévinas, 2001b: 148). 
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aches in pain, while its well-being and enjoyment are given away. Since the 
responsibility the Same has for the Other is rooted in the Infinite, the responsibility is 
infinite. 
II.7. Ethical Discourse and Objectivity 
According to Lévinas, discourse can be either ethical or violent. In the former 
sense, the manifestation of the face as GAR AUTO is already a discourse. “To present 
oneself by signifying is to speak.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 66). Speech, which is ethical, is 
commanding. Lévinas claims that this is ‘true speech’ – it commands responsibility 
without being violent (Lévinas, 1987: 23). Speaking bears within itself the possibility of 
catching interlocutors off-guard, since it brings about novelty and immediacy. Discourse 
is the act of giving the world to the other.42 “To recognize the Other is therefore to come 
to him across the world of possessed thing, but at the same time to establish, by gift, 
community and universality… To speak is to make the world common, to create 
commonplaces.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 76). 
But discourse can also take on the PEITHEIN form, which means persuasive 
rhetoric one uses to achieve personal gains. Such discourse is violent because it limits the 
freedom of the Other. Such is the form of speech that sentences Socrates to death.43 “It is 
for this that it is preeminently violence, that is injustice…” (Lévinas, 1996a: 70). What’s 
more, it is also the language of political battles: it has a potential to both usurp the other’s 
place in the sun.44  
In Otherwise than being, Lévinas reinterprets the above distinction between 
ethical and violent discourse by using different terms: the saying and the said. The said is                                                         
42 “An order common to the interlocutors is established by the positive act of one giving the world, his 
possessions, to the other, or by the positive act of the one justifying himself before the other, that is by 
apology.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 252). 
43 “Socrates is free. He has a fine death... It is an unjust death but a fine death.“ (Lévinas, 1987: 16). 
44 “Let us cite Pascal’s admirable formula: ‘This is my place in the sun, the usurpation of the whole earth 
begins here.‘“ (Lévinas, 2001b: 53). 
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the language of the historian and a scientist: it is the way how worldly entities are 
understood, labeled and talked about ‘in the third person’.45 According to Lévinas, 
ontology grows out of the said as an amphibology of beings and entities (Lévinas, 1998a: 
42). The said is the thematizing of things in the noesis/noema structure.46 It is the answer 
to the question of essence: identifying an object as this and that in the language of 
science. 
II.8. Synchrony and Diachrony 
Intentionality of representation belongs to the realm of the Same. Since the Same, 
in its interiority, is in charge of itself, it also commands its own time. For this Lévinas 
uses the term synchrony: entities are represented in the consciousness at the same time, in 
synchrony. Synchrony is the time of the Same. Signifying is an act of the autonomous 
Self, of the synchronizing of time, as a synchrony. Nothing shakes the sovereign ego: “To 
speak of consciousness is to speak of time.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 32). 
On the other hand, the call for responsibility comes from the outside, from the 
beyond being. It forces the Same to accept a different kind of temporalization. The face 
of the widow or orphan requires me to revert to diachrony, which is the time of the 
Other. In diachrony, one is despite oneself; he is chosen as unique. “The diachrony by 
which the uniqueness of the one has been designated, is the fact that the one is required, 
on the hither side of essence, by responsibility, and is always wanting with respect to 
itself, always insufficiently divested, in deficit, like a painful point.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 57). 
For Lévinas, freedom is not connected to autonomy but to heteronomy. It is in 
serving the Other in responsibility that one finds freedom (Alford, 2004: 153). 
                                                        
45 “Essence is not only conveyed in the said, it is not only ‘expressed‘ in it, but originally – though 
amphibologically – resounds in it qua essence.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 39). 
46 See chapter II of this thesis. 
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“This, rather, is the fasting that I wish: releasing those bound unjustly, 
untying the thongs of the yoke; Setting free the oppressed, breaking every 
yoke, sharing your bread with the hungry, sheltering the oppressed and 
the homeless; Clothing the naked when you see them, and not turning your 
back on your own.“ (Isaiah, 58:6-7) 
II.9. Proximity 
Lévinas claims that essence can be interrupted by the responsibility of one person 
for another. In order to speak about it, one must undertake a ‘reduction’ to the hither side 
of the said: to the signification of the one-for-the-other involved in responsibility 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 45). This signification occurs in proximity, which is a neologism used 
by Lévinas to describe the null-site [non-lieu] where the Same is approached by its 
neighbor. Proximity is the saying – the responsibility of the-one-for-the-other. 
 Proximity does not mean the elimination of distance. Instead, its meaning is 
derived from ‘humanity’ taken as an-archic and non-homogenous. “Proximity is the 
subject that approaches and consequently constitutes a relationship in which I 
participate as a term, but where I am more, or less, than a term.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 82). 
Proximity is transcendence. The ego is set up not in the nominative but in the accusative 
form. Between the ego and the Other no relation exists because they are divided by an 
infinite difference or chasm: they are bound together as a non-indifference (Lévinas, 
1998a: 85). 
Proximity disturbs free consciousness and its temporalization of time. It opens a 
diachrony, “[T]he non-representable status of the neighbor behind which I am late and 
obsessed by the neighbor.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 89). Proximity breaks up essence; like 
enjoyment, it is also independent of essence. Proximity signifies as otherwise than being. 
II.10. Vulnerability and Obsession 
My neighbor commands me as a face that escapes all phenomenality; it is the 
nudity more naked than nudity. In responsibility, the subject is freed from the 
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enchainment to itself. This liberation is anarchic – emerges in a clandestine way as the 
suffering and vulnerability of the other (Lévinas, 1998a: 124). The subjectivity is 
complacent in its enjoyment but also insomniac as a coring out [Dénucleation] of the Self 
for the Other.47 
The Other concerns me in his singularity as an assignation or command, though 
he remains unrecognized. The community with him begins here as a fraternity – 
brotherhood. “[P]roximity is an impossibility to move away without the torsion of a 
complex, without ‘alienation’ or fault.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 87). Without being able to 
capture it by representation, I am commanded by his authority. This is what Lévinas calls 
being obsessed by the Other (Lévinas, 1998a: 89). Obsession, in its passivity, puts the 
ego’s spontaneity – the imperialism of consciousness – into question. 
“You shall not violate the rights of the alien or of the orphan, nor take the 
clothing of a widow as a pledge.” (Deuteronomy, 24:17) 
II.11. Hostage and Substitution 
In Lévinasian ethics, passivity, when taken to the extreme, becomes an 
impossibility of the responsible subject to free himself from responsibility. “The-one-for-
the-other goes to the extent of the-one-being-hostage-for-the-other.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 
141). The term hostage denotes the infinite call for responsibility that the Other’s face 
imposes on me. The an-archic bond between the responsible subject and the stranger, 
who is in need, is more incumbent still. Responsibility leads to substitution. I am no 
longer found guilty for just my own crimes or the inability to do Good – I am also 
responsible for the Goodness and responsibility of the other. In other words, I am called 
to substitute myself for the Other – to wear his/her ragamuffin shoes. 
                                                        
47 By the term coring out [Dénucleation] Lévinas points to the reversion of movement that takes place in 
proximity. In other words, the responsible subject stops being primarily interested in oneself but opens up 
to the Other who is approaching. (Lévinas, 1998a: 64). 
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Obsession by the Other brings about trauma: I am always guilty for not being 
responsible enough for the Other. I am persecuted by the Other and my guilt (Lévinas, 
1998a: 101, 111). I am the only one responsible because “No one can substitute himself 
for me, who substitutes myself for all.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 126). 
Through substitution, one escapes all ontological relations. Here activity and 
passivity coincide. Such is the movement of oneself to the null-site beyond essence: 
expiation (Lévinas, 2001b: 99). “Proximity, immediacy, is to enjoy and to suffer by the 
other. But I can enjoy and suffer by the other only because I am-for-the-other, am 
signification, because the contact with skin is still a proximity of a face, a responsibility, 
an obsession with the other, being-for-the-other, which is the very birth of signification 
beyond being.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 90). 
“Take no revenge and cherish no grudge against your fellow countrymen. 
You shall love your neighbor as yourself. I am the LORD.“          
(Leviticus, 19:18) 
II.12. Love 
Can Lévinas’ terms responsibility, proximity, obsession and substitution be 
illustrated by a discussion on love? In “The Ego and the Totality“ Lévinas claims “All 
love – unless it becomes judgment and justice – is the love of the couple.“ (Lévinas, 1987: 
32). The couple forms an exclusive relationship, to which no one else is permitted. 
According to Lévinas, religious thought when it speaks of and promotes love, fails to 
truthfully describe relationships in society because it neglects plurality of human society 
(Lévinas, 1987: 32). In this sense Lévinas’ understanding of love resembles his concept 
of responsibility: in both scenarios, one is fully dedicated to one’s neighbor. In a 1985 
interview with Christoph von Wolzogen, Lévinas explains that what is truly human is 
love. “And responsibility is actually love, as Pascal said: ‘without concupiscence‘.“ 
 25 
(Lévinas, 2001b: 143).48 In its attempt to emphasize exteriority and ethics, philosophy 
reminds us of such responsibility. It can also lead to un-forgetting the individual human 
fates that the totality would fail to justify. Thus, says Lévinas, “Philosophy is the wisdom 
of love at the service of love.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 162). 
Love starts with the infinite alterity of the Other.49 In the section “Beyond the 
Face“ in Totality and Infinity, Lévinas gives an account of the intimate relationship 
between lovers (Lévinas, 1996a: 254-285). Love is such a relationship, which turns back 
to itself and changes to need. At the same time “To love is to fear for another, to come to 
the assistance of his frailty.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 256). Yet, as was shown above, intimate 
society cannot stay fixed in love. “The unique beings recognized by love, which are 
extrinsic to all genera, must be brought into the community, the world.“ (Lévinas, 2007a: 
120). There are other people, ethically as vulnerable as the lover, who require help. “The 
law has priority over charity.” (Lévinas, 1987: 33).50 
Lévinas’ stance is, that at least in the case of erotic love, the relationship is not 
entirely situated in the null-site of the beyond being, because it oscillates between need 
and Desire. “Love does not transcend unequivocally – it is complacent, it is pleasure and 
dual egoism.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 256). Yet, love between lovers also contains within itself 
a possibility (outside of any possibility of the couple) of the birth of a child. 
                                                        
48 The meaning of the word can also be found in the Hebrew term hesed. “It means charity in its absolute 
gratuity. The responsibility for the other, of which I am speaking, does not expect reciprocity.” (Lévinas, 
2001b: 193). 
49 “In the otherness of the other lies the beginning of all love.“ (Lévinas, 2001b: 134).  
50 This point will be discussed in a greater detail in chapter III of this thesis. 
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“Thus says the Lord GOD: See, I will lift up my hand to the nations, and 
raise my signal to the peoples; they shall bring your sons in their arms, 
and your daughters shall be carried on their shoulders.” (Isaiah, 49:22) 
II.13. Fecundity 
Throughout its works, Lévinas emphasizes the an-archic justification of 
subjectivity; the impossibility to encompass the responsible subject in the totality is a 
sign of transcendence. In his analysis of fecundity, Lévinas shows that the birth of a child 
is a way transcendence can signify through immortality. My child is a stranger who is 
also me at the same time. “He is me a stranger to myself.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 267). The son 
is a possibility beyond all of my possibilities; it is a gift as a completion of Desire and 
Goodness. Thus I can achieve my immortality; thus can one transcend the totality and be 
eternal (Lévinas, 1996a: 268-269). 
Fecundity founds pluralism of human beings as a fraternity of sons. Brotherhood 
is such a relationship with the face that founds solidarity. Through fecundity, time is 
infinitely regenerated – in other words, time is not linked to a being, which is a ‘being-
toward-death’ as claimed by Heidegger, but in fact, time belongs to an infinite being, 
which is able to transcend essence. Lévinas claims “Truth requires both an infinite time 
and a time it will be able to seal, a completed time. The completion of time is not death, 
but messianic time, where the perpetual is converted into eternal.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 284-
285). 
“Through the sea was your path; your way, through the mighty waters, 
though your footsteps were unseen.“ (Psalms, 77:20) 
II.14. Trace and Immemorial Past 
Worldly things – entities – while revealing themselves to the observer’s senses, 
fail to encompass the Goodness of the hither-side of being. This Goodness comes from 
an immemorial past as proximity of another person. “[T]he signification of saying goes 
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beyond the said... It is the signifyingness of saying that going beyond essence that can 
justify the exposedness of being, ontology.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 37-38). The saying arrives 
from an immemorial past, as a reminiscence of something that never was present in the 
consciousness. This ‘touch’ of exteriority that is not intelligible, yet it signifies in the face 
of the other is the trace of the passing Infinity (Lévinas, 1998a: 93). It is passivity, more 
passive than any passivity (Lévinas, 1998a: 14). In proximity, a command of the 
immemorial past echoes and is heard.  
II.15. Eschatological Peace and Pluralism 
Goodness is the possibility of peace. A vision of a hospitable community of 
people is not illusory (Lévinas, 1996a: 21). In its opening and closing chapters, Lévinas’ 
Totality and Infinity claims that war, arising from ontology, is not the ultimate condition 
of mankind. Yet “Only beings capable of war can rise to peace.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 222). 
By questioning the imperialism of the Same, through one’s welcoming of the Other’s 
face, ethics found a community of peace. 
As we have seen in the opening lines of this chapter, Lévinas is not satisfied with 
the philosophy of first principle, which, in fact, endorses oneness and the totality. This is 
also his objection to Western philosophy as a whole: it neglects the individuality of a 
thing, placing it as ‘this’ and ‘that’, as a TODE TI, in a universal concept or order.51 While 
the totality is embedded in war, the secrecy (mystery) of a person and peace between 
people are only possible in a pluralistic society, which is open to alterity and which does 
not project its destiny into some kind of teleological system. Instead, secrecy breaks up 
the historical time. “Only on the basis of this secrecy is pluralism of society possible. It 
attests this secrecy.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 58). It is because of separation, rooted in the idea 
of the Infinite, that individual beings can be in a relation and autonomous at the same 
time. “Thus the metaphysical relation realizes a multiple existing – a pluralism.” 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 220). 
                                                        
51 “The TODE TI is already in a system of relations.“ (Lévinas, 1987: 20). 
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The peace that can overturn ontology of war is an eschatological messianic peace; 
there is no objective evidence of it, yet one can believe in it. “Eschatology institutes a 
relation with being beyond the totality or beyond history, and not with being beyond the 
past and the present.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 22). The trace of this peace can be felt in the face 
of the Other. It is not a hidden God who imposes my neighbor on me. The trace of 
infinity itself assigns me “In the glorious increase of obligation.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 94). 
The question of God’s existence, key for theology and teleology, would only brings us 
back to essence – as a question of ontological finality and mathematical functionalism. 
Due to this fact, knowing remains the norm of the spiritual (Lévinas, 1998a: 96). 
According to Lévinas, spirituality has to be understood differently. Proximity is 
signification outside essence – it is the human fraternity beyond kinship or any pre-
established system. “The trace of a past in a face is not the absence of a non-revealed, 
but the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite which commands in the 
face of the other, and which, like an excluded middle, could not be aimed at.“ (Lévinas, 
1998a: 97). 
But if the target is missed even before the arrow is shot, how can one ever speak 
about transcendence? In other words: Can the saying ever be thematized without the 
said? Can one even speak about the saying? 
“I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their kinsmen, and 
will put my words into his mouth; he shall tell them all that I command 
him.” (Deuteronomy, 18:18) 
II.16. Skepticism and the Role of Philosophy 
Although Western philosophy, for the most part, has been a refutation of 
transcendence, it has not always discouraged skepticism. Even the tradition renews itself; 
language has the potential to shake the totality. “Language is already skepticism.” 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 170). This way, language allows for the written word, laws and 
institutions. Yet this freezing of language in the written word is not definite, inasmuch as 
exteriority penetrates the rigidness of the totality. “The permanent return of skepticism... 
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reminds us of the, in a very broad sense, political character of all logical rationalism, the 
alliance of logic with politics.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 171). 
According to Lévinas, by the means of skepticism philosophy questions the very 
foundations of science it helped to build. Reality – ‘frozen’ and systematically arranged 
and explained in textbooks, does have the last word because the beyond being precedes it 
both in its temporalization and in its location (as a null-site). In this way, that, what 
Lévinas calls the saying, disturbs and erodes the said and given.52 Philosophy, which is 
consigned to the said, converts disinterestedness and signification into essence and 
creates a new said through language. Yet the responsibility for my neighbor is my flight 
out of concepts (Lévinas, 1998a: 126). “Philosophy, in its very diachrony, is the 
consciousness of the breakup of consciousness.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 165). It will be shown 
in chapters IV and V of this thesis that philosophy boosts our immunity against the 
tyranny and violence of the State. 
This is Lévinasian ethics in a nutshell. Since the saying can convert into the said 
and vice versa, so too can ethics turn into politics. In the next chapter, Lévinas’ ideas on 
politics will be introduced. 
                                                        
52 “The philosopher finds language again in the abuses of language of the history of philosophy, in which 
the unsayable and what is beyond being are conveyed before us. But negativity, still correlative with being, 
will not be enough to signify the other than being.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 9. Emphasis in the original text). 
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III. Politics – The Idea of the Third 
III.1. Limits to Responsibility 
We have seen that in the heart of Lévinasian ethics lies the an-archic situation in 
which the Other approaches the Same. In this encounter, the face of the Other expresses 
itself as an infinite command for responsibility. In proximity, the-one-for-itself – the very 
egoism of the Same – undergoes a reversion of intentionality: it becomes the-one-for-the-
other. The relation between the Self and the Other is asymmetrical in the way that the 
Other is always respected as my ‘master’. The responsibility is so vast to the point that 
one is obsessed by the Other, becomes his hostage and substitutes oneself for the Other.  
Yet are there any limits to this responsibility of the one-for-the-other or 
disinterestedness? We know well, through naïve experience, that on a practical level the 
call for infinite responsibility can never be fully answered. Lévinas expresses this in a 
paradoxical statement that “The better I accomplish my duty, the fewer rights I have; the 
more I am just the more guilty I am.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 244). 
Another important question can be posed if abnegation of the subject for the other 
– giving one’s life – would not jeopardize responsibility of the Same if it is no longer 
here. This point is underlined in Totality and Infinity. While Lévinas claims that the 
Desire for the Infinite leads the Same to give up enjoyment (and since life itself is 
enjoyment, as shown above, to give up even its life),53 only an existing subject can be 
called to responsibility.  
The qualification of one’s responsibility is more incumbent still. The Other and I 
are not the only two people in the world. Am I responsible for the other ‘Others’ as well? 
Who is to be given preference – the Other, the Other’s Other or somebody different? 
Moreover, how far do my responsibilities go in relation to those Others who have not 
been born yet or to those who have passed away? 
                                                        
53 “[W]e may have responsibilities for which we must consent to death.“ (Lévinas, 2006a: 57). 
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III.2. The Third 
It is at this point in the discussion that Lévinas introduces the term the third. 
According to Jill Robbins (Lévinas, 2001b: 11. Jill Robin’s introduction), Lévinas first 
invoked his ideas on the third in the 1954 essay “The Ego and the Totality“ (Lévinas, 
1987: 25-45). In Totality and Infinity Lévinas showed that the metaphysical Desire for 
Infinity leads the human Self to open up to another person. Ethics starts with the 
phenomenology of the face. “Conscience welcomes the Other.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 84). The 
discourse between the Same and the Other is ethical. Yet the ethical ‘relationship’ does 
reduce its participants to a common term or genus. “The third party looks at me in the 
eyes of the Other – language is justice.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 213). Who is this third party 
and how does he pose any limits to my responsibility? 
In “The Ego and the Totality”, Lévinas claims that with the third party begins all 
social reality, which is the fact of universality. “Society inevitably involves the existence 
of a third party.” (Lévinas, 1987: 32). What’s more, it is precisely due to ‘third-ness’ – 
the multiplicity of human beings outside of an intimate society of two – that pardon isn’t 
possible. The apology for and forgiveness related to the faults committed against one 
person can cause harm to the third. For this, Lévinas uses the term social wrong, which is 
“Something committed without my knowledge, against a multitude of third parties, whom 
I will never face.” (Lévinas, 1987: 33). This point can be paraphrased that one is guilty 
because he is innocent; not-knowing (or non-acting) leads to injuring of the third.54  
As Lévinas’ thinking developed over the years, his understanding of the concept 
of the third underwent changes. Lévinas gives his most clear explanation in Otherwise 
than Being. “The third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and 
also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 157). People 
other than the Other, who approaches me in proximity, become represented. In keeping 
with his understanding of infinite responsibility, Lévinas makes a radical claim that in 
fact it is all the Others that the subject is obsessed with (Lévinas, 1998a: 158). The 
responsible subject has to make conscious choices and compromises, which precisely                                                         
54 The relationship between responsibility and action will be analyzed in chapter V of this thesis. 
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means that he/she has to judge between the Other and the third, who represents all of 
humankind. The third party is therefore closely connected to the concept of justice. 
“You shall not act dishonestly in rendering judgment. Show neither 
partiality to the weak nor deference to the mighty, but judge your fellow 
men justly.” (Leviticus, 19:15) 
III.3. Justice 
While the relationship face-to-face takes place outside of cognition, the third 
wakes up consciousness.55 “Must not human beings, who are incomparable, be 
compared? Thus justice, here, takes precedence over the taking upon oneself of the fate 
of the other.” (Lévinas, 1998b: 104). Justice limits my responsibility for the Other and 
thus it becomes violence against him.56 But, at the same time, it is the only way possible 
to bring about peace and to create a fraternity of men. This ‘first violence’ (Lévinas, 
2001b: 56) is necessary to prevent an endless spiral of violence that could be launched 
without proper and just laws. As hinted by Raul Fornet and Alfredo Gomez in an 
interview with Lévinas, the executioner does not have a face, to which Lévinas replies: 
“When I speak of Justice, I introduce the idea of the struggle with evil, I separate myself 
from the idea of nonresistance to evil.” (Lévinas, 1998b: 105). 
Only in society – and not in a face-to-face relationship or intimacy of love – does 
justice become an issue.57 Humankind understood by consciousness as a multiplicity of 
‘objects’ is a totality. In “The Ego and the Totality”, Lévinas searches for the moral basis 
for thought – thought initiated by the awareness of another man’s freedom. “Conceiving 
of a freedom external to my own is the first thought.” (Lévinas, 1999: 28). He finds it in 
economic justice (Lévinas, 1999: 29). Even man can be quantified and exchanged as a                                                         
55 “It is inasmuch as I have not only to respond to the Face of the other, but alongside him to approach the 
third party, that the necessity for the theoretical attitude arises.“ (Lévinas, 1998b: 103). 
56 “There is a certain measure of violence necessary in terms of justice.“ (Lévinas, 1998b: 105). 
57 “The concern for justice... is the spirit in society.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 160). 
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commodity (Lévinas, 1999: 44-45).58 In his later works, especially in Otherwise than 
Being, Lévinas rethinks the term justice on a more general level: as a necessity for 
making any kind of judgment. And what’s more: the third opens up the space for politics. 
In Lévinas’ philosophy, politics goes hand in hand with ethics, a belief he acquired while 
attending classes of Maurice Pradines (Lévinas, 2001b: 28). 
As will be shown below, the pursuit for justice already presupposes politics and 
the creation of the State. 
III.4. The ‘Idea of the Third’ 
For Lévinas, justice is a retreat to essence: by weighing who should be given a 
preference, the subject is already posing its judgment over being. In order to issue a 
verdict, particular TODE TI need to be placed before consciousness as this and that. My 
responsibility, evoked by the desolation of other people, whom I might not even know, is 
limited. Thus, with the third party, the saying reverts into the said. But unlike in Western 
philosophy, whose emphasis on the moment of ‘foundation’ and ‘unity’ Lévinas 
criticizes, the said of justice is not the final destination of thought. Between ethics and 
politics there is an on-going movement back and forth – a movement which Susan 
Handelman titled ‘oscillation’ (Handelman referred to in Simmons, 2003: 50). In justice, 
the saying reverts to the said, but at the same time, the said can revert to the saying in 
proximity. Moreover, the judgment of justice is different from the scientific approach of 
Greek philosophy. 
In Totality and Infinity, Lévinas uses an analogy of Descartes' proof of God´s 
existence from the Third Meditation to explain how the idea of the Infinite exceeds all 
powers of the thinking ego. It belongs to the otherwise than being, of which the human 
Self can have no knowledge. “[T]he idea of infinity is exceptional in that its ideatum 
surpasses its idea…“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 49. Emphasis in the original text). The Desire for 
the Infinite, raised by the approach of the Other cannot become an object of the free 
thought. The Other is infinitely different (or non-indifferent) from the Same.                                                         
58 This point will be more developed in chapter IV of this thesis. 
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Consciousness of the Same cannot provide a platform for representing the Other. It is, 
however, logical to ask, if the third party presents himself to the subject as an idea or if its 
ideatum exceeds any form of cognition. What relationship does there exist between the 
third and consciousness? 
Interpreting Lévinas one step further, I claim that in proximity to one's neighbor 
the responsible subject is confronted with something I call the idea of the third. Lévinas 
argues, “If there were no order of Justice, there would be no limit to my responsibility.“ 
(Lévinas, 1998b: 105). The third party thus challenges my infinite openness to the Other 
and forces me to see the Other as this and that. It is as if the third grabbed my hand and 
interrupted my meeting with the Other's face by taking me to a high place where I can see 
all the misery of the world. Unlike the Other in proximity, the third belongs to the sphere 
of the intelligible; the idea of the third is the conscious perception of the Other and of all 
the ‘Others’. It is here that judgment must be made: “There must be justice among 
incomparable ones.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 16). 
In order to determine the relationship between the idea of the third and 
consciousness, I shall turn to introductory passages of Otherwise than Being. In an ethical 
situation, when one is confronted with the face of the Other, temporality is signified as 
the ‘time of the Other’ or diachrony. “Diachrony is the refusal of conjunction, the non-
thematizable, and in this sense, infinite. [T]his refusal of the present... commands me and 
ordains me to the other, to the first one on the scene, and makes me approach him, makes 
me his neighbor.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 11). The Other is different from me in a way that his 
alterity exceeds essence; this alterity belongs to the hither side of being. On the other 
hand, the idea of the third is the conscious re-presentation of all the absent ‘Others’ at the 
same time, or in synchrony. If diachrony is ‘time of the Other’ then synchrony is in more 
than one respect ‘the time of the Same’, as Lévinas discovered in Husserl’s philosophy. 
Firstly, synchrony is the assembling of time according to the free consciousness: this 
Signifying is an act of the autonomous Self. Secondly, consciousness and time are 
inseparable: “To speak of consciousness is to speak of time.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 32). 
So, does the idea of the third exceed its ideatum? If the third is the waking up of 
consciousness and if the exigency of choosing between the Other and the third are at 
stake, then the idea of the third is fully absorbed by consciousness and does not exceed it. 
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Yet, the point is not very clear and arguing on Lévinas’ behalf could be audacious. 
Lévinas writes: “The act of consciousness is motivated by the presence of a third party 
alongside of the neighbor approached.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 16). In other words, the notion 
of the third is closely connected to the primordial ethical relationship to the Other.59 As 
we have seen in chapter II, this relationship is driven by the Desire for the Infinite, which 
Lévinas claims to exceed its ideatum. This is an ambiguous point: “In the proximity of the 
other, all the others than the other obsess me, and already this obsession cries out for 
justice, demands measure and knowing, is consciousness.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 158). 
Outside of any chronological order, that would be set up by a historian, there seems to be 
either an an-archic primacy of ethics or an an-archical simultaneousness or togetherness 
(as paradoxical as it may seem) of ethics and politics. If the former is true, then one can 
argue beyond Lévinasian philosophy that the idea of the third could be indicated by 
ethics but does not exceed its ideatum. If, on the other hand, the latter stands, then not 
only the Infinite and the idea but also the idea of the third exceeds its ideatum. 
This question touches the key dichotomy between totality and infinity – or politics 
and ethics or being and otherwise than being – in Emmanuel Lévinas’ thought. Which 
one is primary? In the opening part of Otherwise than Being, Lévinas first claims, “The 
way of thinking proposed here does not fail to recognize being or treat it, ridiculously 
and pretentiously, with disdain, as the fall from a higher order or disorder. On the 
contrary, it is on the basis of proximity that being takes on its just meaning.“ (Lévinas, 
1998a: 16). Yet, in the central chapter titled “Substitution“, he argues that “The Good is 
above being.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 122). And throughout his works, it has always been 
Lévinas’ goal to recall Jewish ‘moments’ in the history of philosophy. For example, the 
beyond being was endorsed by Plato in his description of the Good and in Descartes’ 
contemplation of God at the end the Third Meditation. Ethics do seem to be valued higher 
by Lévinas than politics. If this is also true, then what I have called the idea of the third 
                                                        
59 Could it perhaps be said that there could be no notion of the third without the ethical relationship to the 
Other? 
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has only a secondary place to ethics and it does not exceed its ideatum because 
consciousness wakes up together with it.60 
Lastly, we can also speculate on how consciousness obtains knowledge about ‘all 
the Others’ whom we might have not even met but who are represented in the idea of the 
third. Is the oscillation between ethics and politics a movement that human beings are 
born with? Could it be that as much as human beings are capable of philosophizing, they 
are also capable of generalizing the ethical experience? Does the saying revert into the 
said just “by the way”? 
In my understanding, the difference between how many people we know and how 
many people we are aware of is not of importance to Lévinas. The experience of 
proximity and the idea of the third that I have just described are, in fact, all we need to 
know, regardless of the number of ‘third persons’ represented in one’s consciousness. It 
can be three other people (e.g. a nuclear family) or the population of the whole world, 
about which I learn by reading the newspaper, watching TV or when I talk to my 
‘Others’. As claimed by Alford, on the empirical level, our judgment between the Other 
and the third (or the fourth etc.) will always be limited by the amount of time and 
resources we have available and are willing to sacrifice (Alford, 2004: 156). And Lévinas 
addresses this point directly in his essay “Peace and Proximity”: “To the extravagant 
generosity of the for-the-other is superimposed a reasonable order, ancillary or angelic, 
of justice through knowledge, and philosophy here is a measure brought to the infinity of 
the being-for-the-other of peace and proximity, and is like a wisdom of love.” (Lévinas, 
1996b: 169. Emphasis in the original text). The human life is both deepened and 
burdened by ethics and politics. 
We have discussed Lévinas’ approach to both ethics and politics. Can they be 
reconciled? The relation between ethics and politics will be analyzed later in regards to 
Lévinas’ understanding of the role of the State. In the next chapter, titled “The Idea of the                                                         
60 In regard to the arrival of the third, Caygill raises an interesting question: Can the ‘I’ form an alliance 
with the third against the other? In other words, in Lévinasian ethics, can the third become preference over 
the other? Caygill’s answer is negative: “[E]ven to expect direct relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘third’ is 
wholly to misunderstand Lévinas’ notion of alterity.” (Caygill, 2002: 133). This could be interpreted as 
another proof that for Lévinas, politics is secondary to ethics. 
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State” our attention will be drawn to the question of giving preference. If the idea of the 
third contains all of humanity, who should be addressed by our “aprés-vous”?61 
“You shall have but one rule, for alien and native alike. I, the LORD, am 
your God.” (Leviticus 24:22) 
III.5. The Rights of Man 
In chapter II of this thesis, Lévinas’ main ethical arguments were presented under 
the respect of the ultimate primacy of the Other. The asymmetry of the relationship 
between the same and the Other is signified in being-for-the-other or substitution, the 
condition of being a hostage for the other person. This situation, in which “The more I 
answer, the more I am responsible” (Lévinas, 1998a: 93) is ethical in a pure sense. But 
how can it be translated into politics, when consciousness was woken up by the fact of 
existence of the third? 
Lévinas directly analyzes this problem under the notion of human rights (or as he 
calls them, rights of man) in three short essays: “The Rights of Man and Good Will”, 
“The Rights of the Other Man” and “The rights of Man and the Rights of the Other”62 
and in sporadic comments in some of his other works. His understanding of the concept 
of natural rights and human rights brings a new light into the problem. 
Lévinas distinguishes between the ‘original rights’ and the ‘broad notion of the 
rights of man.’ (Lévinas, 1994: 116-121). The former is granted to each person “prior to 
any entitlement: to all tradition, all jurisprudence, all granting of privileges, awards or 
titles, all consecration by a will abusively claiming the name of reason” (Lévinas, 1999: 
117), such as “the rights to life and security, to the free disposal of one’s goods, and the                                                         
61 “One must yield to the other the first place in everything. From the ‘après vous‘ before the open door 
right up to the disposition – hardly possible, but holiness demands it – to die for the other.“ (Lévinas, 
2001b: 47). 
62 “The Rights of Man and Good Will“ (Lévinas, 1998b: 155-158), “The Rights of the Other Man” 
(Lévinas, 1999: 145-149), and “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other” (Lévinas, 1994: 116-125). 
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equality of all men before the law, to freedom of thought and its expression, to education 
and participation in political power.” (Lévinas, 1994: 120). The latter group of rights is 
socially predetermined: it is derived from a specific social and cultural environment. 
The ‘non-conditionality’ or ‘naturality’ of the rights of man in the first sense 
reminds us of the encounter of the Other’s face, which signifies without representation. 
Here too, the Other is given preference not due to his looks, merits or status. The face of 
the Other is the face of the widow, orphan or beggar, who calls me to take on my 
responsibility for him or her. Yet, as much as the third disrupts the exclusivity of my 
relation to the other,63 requiring my judgment over being, so too the rights of man 
become a struggle for preference. The first question that comes to one’s mind is: whose 
right is greater? 
Another problem lies in the fact that though the original rights of man are a priori 
in theory, their introduction into the legal system of a country results in specific 
modifications caused by the social environment.64 “Henceforth there would be attached 
to the notion of the rights of man – inseparably, and in ever-increasing numbers – all the 
legal rules that are necessary conditions for the actual exercise of those rights.” 
(Lévinas, 1994: 120). These are rights such as the right to health, to happiness and 
freedom of movement (Lévinas, 1994: 120). It comes of no surprise that in a particular 
socio-political environment, rights of man can become tools for one person to gain 
advantage over another.  
Where does the demand for more rights end? And in this situation, are all holders 
of rights equal before the law (which is also socially determined)? Paradoxically, the 
recalling of the rights of man can disrupt peace; the claiming of rights can launch “The 
war of each against all, based on the Rights of Man!” (Lévinas, 1999: 147). 
                                                        
63 “The presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, 
of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and a command that commands commanding.“ (Lévinas, 
1996a: 213). 
64 “It is not always easy, in defense of the rights of man (and this is an important, but practical, problem) to 
establish an order of priority for those concrete rights. It may vary as a function of the actual situation in 
each country.“ (Lévinas, 1998b: 156). 
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In order to avoid a theory that would allow for ‘burgeoning’ of the rights of 
man,65 Lévinas presents his own understanding of the issue that is in keeping with his 
ethics. “The right of man, absolutely and originally, takes on meaning only in the other, 
as the right of the other man. A right with respect to which I am never released.” 
(Lévinas, 1999: 127. Emphasis in the original text). The Other limits my free will, which 
is another way to say that “We have no right, it is always the other who has rights.” 
(Vladimir Jankélevitch quoted in Lévinas, 2001b: 214). Together with Lévinas we can 
now ask: does it not bear some submission? Lévinas’ answer is exemplary: there is no 
submission, if such limitation comes out of Goodness (Lévinas, 1999: 149). 
Another crucial question is tied to the notion of the rights of man: they claim to be 
universal, granting equal rights to all. But even if we pass the already discussed problem 
of their cultural predetermination, can they really be granted equally? Lévinas addresses 
this problem in Otherwise than Being: “The equality of all is borne by my inequality, the 
surplus of my duties over my rights.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 159). Because of the asymmetry 
that arises from an ethical relationship, the Other has to be given preference: I always 
have more duties than rights. Yet, by not ignoring the third (and the whole of mankind 
that the third represents) and by permitting the third to become the Other, there can be 
equality borne by my inequality. 
According to Marek Skovajsa, in Lévinas’ understanding, it is the rights of man 
“that represent the missing link between myself, the hostage of the other, subject of an 
ethical relationship and the anonymous world of politics and justice…” (Skovajsa, 2006: 
194. Translated from Czech to English by author). The role of the State is to secure 
justice. “There must be justice among incomparable ones.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 16). This 
brings about an important question: Are the rights of man part of the State? 
As I will show in the next two chapters (IV “The Idea of the State” and V “The 
Idea of Civil Society”), the rights of man are only part of the State if they are codified in 
the law. In this form, the rights of man are contained within the State. In order to secure 
justice, among those who cannot be compared – between all citizens – rights of man                                                         
65 The term ‘burgeoning’ is used by Simmons in his analysis of the notion of the Rights of Man in Lévinas’ 
philosophy (Simmons, 2003: 50). 
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become obligatory through the State’s institutions. What functions Lévinas attributes to 
the State will be explained in the following chapter. But as was pointed out in this 
chapter, Lévinasian ethics understands human rights more broadly as the rights of the 
Other, which are always greater than my own rights. This second understanding of the 
rights of man has different implications and is important for understanding civil society 
in Lévinas’ terms.66
                                                        
66 See chapter V of this thesis. 
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IV. The Idea of the State 
“‘But how can I alone bear the crushing burden that you are, along with 
your bickering? Choose wise, intelligent and experienced men from each 
of your tribes, that I may appoint them as your leaders.'“     
(Deuteronomy, 1:12-13) 
IV.1. The State 
In the previous chapter, I have noted that the idea of the third brings about the 
necessity to judge. In order to facilitate comparison between all Others, certain 
institutions need to be established. I shall soon elaborate on Lévinas’ claim that in order 
to secure justice there needs to be the State. Furthermore, “The State represents the 
highest human achievement in the lives of Western peoples.” (Lévinas, 1997a: 216). 
The conscious act of comparing one’s Others always brings about an element of 
violence because our preference to one person leads to our omitting of another person’s 
demands. Yet, Lévinas always reminds his readers that ethics and politics are not entirely 
bifurcated. “Justice itself is born of charity. They can seem alien when they are presented 
as successive stages; in reality, they are inseparable and simultaneous…” (Lévinas, 
1998b: 107). Due to human plurality – the fact that one always finds oneself in the 
company of other people – State institutions define the framework for justice.67 Politics 
and laws, together with citizens’ rights and responsibilities, in fact, make it easier for 
individuals to judge between the Other and the Other’s Other. Through the judiciary 
system, the State even provides an arena where judgments can take place on a more 
formal and binding level. “Consequently, the work of the State, while denying it in some 
manner, comes to supplement this work of interpersonal responsibility which touches the 
individual in his uniqueness and which is the work of the individual in his uniqueness as                                                         
67 “In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the 
I with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of 
universality.“ (Lévinas, 1996a: 300). 
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the one responsible.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 67). In the case of Europe, Lévinas claims, “[T]he 
Biblical heritage implies the necessity of the Greek heritage.” (Lévinas, 1996b: 168). We 
can say that the State ‘institutionalizes’ ethics; in its attempt to do so, however, it turns 
ethics into politics.68  
The analysis of the State that is rooted in the ethical raises legitimate objections. 
First of all, on a more practical level: Is the State always just? For example, in the last 
century, the world witnessed a number of brutal and barbaric regimes – to which even 
Lévinas’ own family fell victim. Secondly, even in modern democratic states, abuses of 
power are widespread. Regardless of whether people hold political power or not, they are 
not saints. Using Simmons’ words, “How can the State be justified in the face of the 
Other?” (Simmons, 2003: 66). Lastly, we can ask Lévinas if there is any type of political 
regime that is best suitable for the reconciliation of ethics and politics. 
In his analysis, Lévinas admits that the State contains elementary violence. But 
this comes as no surprise, given that the third person demands our judgment and our 
turning away from the face of the Other. “I have called it the first violence: in the 
concern not to misrecognize the face of the other man is the refusal to see only the face.” 
(Simmons, 2003: 66). On the practical level, this violence can be misused for achieving 
personal benefits. Holiness is rare. “I do not want to say that the world is heading toward 
holiness; men are not saints. However, each man understands holiness.” (Lévinas, 
2001b: 90). So, what kind of regime is the most suitable for overcoming selfish 
tendencies of man? 
Lévinas’ answer to this question has a deep theoretical foundation. His approach 
is innovative, because it reverses the emphasis of the State’s origin. A sharp contrast can 
be drawn from Hobbes’s understanding of the role of the State. For Hobbes, the State is 
the limitation of violence. For Lévinas, the state is a limitation of responsibility. “[I]t is in 
terms of the relation to the Face or of me before the other that we can speak of the                                                         
68 Lévinas admits the movement toward the other man even to Marxism. (Lévinas, 2001b: 88). But he is 
also aware of the fact that if goodness becomes ‘obligatory’ for all, the State becomes tyrannical. “To seek 
for a society which is straightforward charitable, a regime which is straightforward charitable, is to run 
the risk of Stalinism.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 51). 
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legitimacy or illegitimacy of the state. A state in which the interpersonal relationship is 
impossible, in which it is directed in advance by the determinism proper to the state, is a 
totalitarian state. So there is a limit to the state. Whereas, in Hobbes’s vision – in which 
the state emerges not from the limitation of charity, but from the limitation of violence – 
one cannot set a limit on the state.” (Lévinas, 1998b: 105). Hobbes understands humans 
to be ‘wolves to their fellow men’ – inherently egoistic and thus violent; this way the 
State has a role of contesting individual selfishness. For Lévinas, on the other hand, man 
is essentially good (or ‘holy’) and the original situation is primordial peace.69 Only this 
way can the ego be put into question (Simmons, 2003: 81). And, as was highlighted by 
Caygill, only the State that is founded on the limitation of responsibility can be open to 
criticism and revolt (Caygill, 2002: 129). As was shown in the analysis of the rights of 
man, Lévinas also understands differently the concept of natural rights. They are not 
someone’s property that can be given up to the State as part of a social contract. Quite 
contrary, it is always the Other who has rights – not me (Lévinas, 1999: 127). 
“Then David said to Nathan, ‘I have sinned against the LORD.’ Nathan 
answered David: ‘The LORD on his part has forgiven your sin: you shall 
not die.’” (2 Samuel, 12:13) 
IV.2. The Liberal Democratic State  
For Lévinas, the State that can be the most just by allowing politics to be infused 
by ethics is the liberal democratic state. Yet, from the very start we should be careful 
what meaning Lévinas gives to staple terms of the language of political science. For 
example, according to Alford, Lévinas’ liberalism is ‘inverted liberalism’ because                                                         
69 “Why, then, should one insist on the notion of the man who is not wolf to the other man, of the man who 
is responsible for the other man who always encumbers him? I think that the universality of the law in the 
State – all this violence done to the particular – is not license pure and simple, because as long as the State 
remains liberal its law is not yet completed and can always be more just than its actual justice.“ (Lévinas, 
2001b: 68). 
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individual freedoms are not there for the individual (Alford, 2004: 147). Instead, they are 
the necessary condition for one to “see the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears 
of the Other (Autrui).” (Lévinas, 1996b: 23). In this respect, Lévinas pays special 
attention to the freedom of speech. Lévinas recalls that upon his arrival to Strasbourg in 
1923 this was what he most appreciated: “The first thing I gain is freedom. For me, 
freedom of speech is the first freedom.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 91). This aspect of democracy 
is not only the invention of the Greeks. The history of the Jewish people would not be 
complete without interventions from the prophets. “It is an extremely bold, audacious 
speech, since the prophet always speaks before the king; the prophet is not in hiding, he 
is not preparing an underground revelation. In the Bible – it’s amazing – the king accepts 
this direct opposition.” (Lévinas, 1998b: 106). In modern democracies, political 
opposition, as well as ordinary citizens, have this ‘prophetic’ function.70 This point will 
be discussed more thoroughly in chapter V of this thesis. 
Freedom of speech goes hand in hand with the ability of the system to work on 
improving itself. For Lévinas, the violation of the right to speak up is typical for 
totalitarian regimes because they are enclosed in a rigid system. “Political totalitarianism 
rests on an ontological totalitarianism. Being is all, a Being in which nothing finishes 
and nothing begins. Nothing stands opposed to it and no one judges it.” (Lévinas, 1997a: 
206-207). In the same manner, totalitarian states persecuted criticism and opposition of 
any kind. In their pursuit of total control they acted as tyrants. According to Lévinas, 
tyranny “has unlimited resources at its disposal, those of love and wealth, torture and 
hunger, silence and rhetoric. It can exterminate in the tyrannized soul even the very 
capacity to be struck, that is, even the ability to obey on command.” (Lévinas, 1987: 16). 
Such violence is not only ‘elementary’, which was explained in the opening part of this 
chapter; not only do judgment issued in justice always hurt someone. There are also 
states – totalitarian states – which not only refused to look at their citizens face-to-face, 
                                                        
70 “The only believable word is the one that can lift itself out of its eternal contest and return to the human 
lips that speak it, in order to fly from man to man and judge history, instead of remaining a symptom or an 
effect or a ruse.“ (Lévinas, 1997a: 207). 
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but they were also deliberately ‘hitting’ the Other’s face. Lévinas claims that they 
approached the Other from an indirect angle (Lévinas, 1987: 19). 
Opposite this ‘impersonal universe’ stands democracy. Democracy is for Lévinas 
the least violent form of the State. “[I]n Western democracies, all tomorrows are 
guaranteed, peace reigns, and true misery hardly exists anymore… When one has known 
other regimes and other modes of life, one can even consider this ideal a form of human 
perfection.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 185). The liberal democratic State allows ethics to enter the 
political discourse through skepticism. On the final pages of Otherwise than Being, 
Lévinas outlines the philosophical duality between skepticism and the return of 
skepticism. This situation of uncertainty and anxiety is philosophy in its true sense. 
“Skepticism is refutable, but it returns.” (Lévinas, 1998a: 168). But philosophy is not 
even a step away from politics and Lévinas’ political statements reflect this mutual 
inclination. Logic and politics are allied (Lévinas, 1998a: 171). Skepticism, or the 
admittance of faultiness, is the act of re-saying the said. “By admitting its imperfection, 
by arranging for a recourse for the judged, justice is already questioning the State. This 
is why democracy is the necessary prolongation of the State. It is not one regime possible 
among others, but the only suitable one.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 194). Public opinion channels 
and voices this skepticism about verdicts issued by the State and on this foundation 
democracy stands (Lévinas, 2001b: 183). For all of these reasons Lévinas call himself a 
democrat (Lévinas, 2001b: 195). Yet modern democracy – in its mass form – is in a way 
totalitarian: it aims to treat everyone the same.71 
To conclude, in the liberal democratic State, laws and institutions are not forever 
frozen in a totality that either disregards or even persecutes any attempts to change it. On 
the contrary, liberal democracy provides such political framework that is based on 
criticism and openness to change. The ‘idea of the State’ (Lévinas, 2001b: 68), as 
understood by Lévinas, guarantees the rule of law, rights of man and key individual and 
collective freedoms that enable ethical relations to inspire and correct justice.                                                         
71 This is a concern to Alford: “Treating everyone the same is better than invidious discrimination, but it 
violates the humanity of your particularity. You don’t deserve to be treated like everyone else; you deserve 
to be treated like you.“ (Alford, 2004: 155). 
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IV.3. Ethics and Politics in Relation to the State 
Judging from the above, it almost seems that the State is a way to reconcile ethics 
and politics, given the meaning that was assigned to them by Lévinas. Yet, could it also 
be so, that the State is purely political, as some of Lévinas’ arguments might hint, in 
which case the notion of reconciliation between the two worlds would be incorrect? 
The liberal State offers the possibility for infusion of the political by the ethical. 
Lévinas claims that the ethical can enter political decisions and thus parry tyranny.72 In 
the interview “In the Name of the Other”, he quotes an old Rabbinic text which says: “Do 
not look at the face before the verdict. Once the verdict has been given, look at the face.” 
(Lévinas, 2001b: 194). This illustrates that in the State, there exists a possibility for the 
ethical stands to influence political decisions. Such possibility does not come from within 
the State: it comes from the beyond being, as proximity. Obviously, in reality this does 
not apply to all the states at all times. The essence of the State (all its institutions 
including laws) can be corrected. 
But the issue is not as simple. Lévinas always makes a point that justice belongs 
to the political. Justice is the driving force behind all comparison and decision. And as we 
have seen, the acts of deciding, weighing and selecting are closely connected to the 
arrival of the third. And since, as I have argued, the idea of the third does not exceed its 
ideatum, it is enclosed within the free consciousness. In other words, it is in fact a way of 
totalizing conducted by the Same. Justice is both the State‘s foundation and justification. 
And all institutions – be it courts, agoras, or laws, are political. 
The reconciliation between ethics and politics in the State is also not possible if 
we follow Lévinas’ reasoning. In chapters II, and III, of this thesis the insurmountable 
difference between the saying and the said was analyzed. While the former belongs to 
ethics, the latter is political. The State is unable to reconcile this difference – as much as 
the saying and the said don’t have the same unifying term. 
                                                        
72 “[T]he simple fact of having lived in a well-governed State doe not keep one from making a bad choice, 
and it is philosophy, that is the divine wisdom dwelling within us, that makes us immune to tyranny.“ 
(Lévinas, 1987: 23). 
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“When you have come into the land which the LORD, your God, is giving 
you, and have occupied it and settled in it, should you then decide to have 
a king over you like all the surrounding nations.“ (Deuteronomy, 17:14) 
IV.4. Lévinas and the Jewish State 
It is not this thesis’s primary focus to analyze Lévinas’ opinions on the existence 
of the Jewish State. On the other hand, since Lévinas’ ethics is rooted in his rich and vast 
knowledge of Judaism and since the Jewish tradition provided inspiration for his most 
radical claims, political ideas scattered across his works relate to the State of Israel with 
various degrees of intensity. For those who wish to strictly separate Lévinas’ philosophy 
from his religious thought, this brings about a number of problems. To what extent is 
Israel a State like any other? Does the history of the Jewish people attribute a new 
meaning to the Jewish State and to the idea of the State in general? 
First, of all, throughout his life, Lévinas followed the developments in the Middle 
East with a great interest. On a number of occasions he stepped out and voiced his 
opinions on the issue73, though he was aware that his judgments were issued in the 
Diaspora: “I will say to you that there are many things about which I cannot speak 
because I am not in Israel.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 82). Like in the case of other Jewish 
thinkers who survived the shoah,74 the founding and existence of Israel was an important 
question to Lévinas. It was a primary concern to him to think through the tension between 
the newly established Jewish State and the Diaspora (Bouretz, 2009: 344-345). Lévinas’ 
attitude is ambivalent – on one hand he claims that the political project is required in 
order to create a space for ethics: “Its necessity is ethical – indeed, it’s an old ethical idea                                                         
73 Essay “Politics, After!“ (Lévinas, 1989: 277-283), while analyzing the roots of anti-semitism and their 
implication on the project of the Jewish State, appreciated Egyptian President’s visit to Jerusalem on 
November 19, 1977. Interview “Ethics and Politics“ was a reaction to the indifference Israel Defense 
Forces showed while hundreds of Arabs in Sabra and Chatila camps were massacred by Christian soldiers 
in Lebanon in September 1982 (Lévinas, 1989: 289-297). 
74 To name some of the most fruitful writers: Martin Buber (1878-1965), Leo Strauss (1899-1973), 
Gershom Sholem (1897-1982) and Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). 
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which commands us precisely to defend our neighbors. My people and my kin are still my 
neighbors.” (Lévinas, 1989: 292). On the other hand, he expresses reservations to the 
idea that the establishment of a modern secular State is the final goal for the Jews. “To 
live like every other people on earth, with police and cinemas and cafés and newspapers 
– what a glorious destiny!“ (Lévinas, 1997a: 216). Lévinas sees the State of Israel as a 
political tool that is necessary for the Israeli people to fulfill its role to open the ethical to 
the world and bring about peace. In other words, it is necessary to translate the Holy texts 
into Greek by infusing the rational order of the Western world – the cradle of both 
philosophy and the modern states – with the message of the Bible. “We are faced with the 
great task of articulating in Greek those principles of which Greece had no knowledge.“ 
(Lévinas, 1989: 287).  
At the same time, Lévinas is aware of the reality of the political life: the Zionist 
movement that has been successful can easily fall into the trap of land-ownership and can 
misuse justice in order to sustain the State. This is also an indicator of religious piety. 
“The contrast is between those who seek to have a State in order to have justice and those 
who seek justice in order to ensure the survival of the State.“ (Lévinas, 1997a: 218).  
After familiarizing ourselves with Lévinas’ ethics and the idea of the third, this 
does not seem as a paradox. The chosenness of the Jewish people predestines them to 
seek a ‘base’ for proximity. Ethical relations of one person toward the Other also require 
that one has a dwelling – an original ‘at home’ – from which one can open up and 
approach the Other. In this light, the Jewish State provides this space for political 
engagement so that justice could be established. The State is heralded in old biblical 
texts: the kingdom expresses the exact same tensions between ethics and politics among 
Israelites. The State is a ’provisional abdication‘ (Lévinas, 1989: 270) to ethics in order to 
enable ethics. “What is important above all is the idea that not only is the essence of the 
State not in contradiction with the absolute order, but that it has been called up by that 
order.“ (Lévinas, 1989: 271). According to Pierre Bouretz, Lévinas wishes to separate 
arguments for the Jewish State from all theodicy (Bouretz, 2009: 343). Missing of these 
two components of the Jewish consciousness could result in violence and egoism. From 
this angle, Lévinas provides inner criticism of the political project, though he understands 
its necessity. “I would only say that now, under the given circumstances, as a State is the 
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only form in which Israel – the people and the culture – can survive.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 
81). The implications of this are that, Israel has taken on the commitment to sustain its 
monotheistic message through politics (Lévinas, 1989: 277). 
We can conclude here that for Lévinas, the Jewish State should be relieved of 
eschatological expectations and instead provide a space for the defense of one’s neighbor. 
In other words, the State is not the final goal; instead, it is a tool to secure peace. Some 
scholars such as Howard Caygill and Simon Critchley, criticize this point: “In relation to 
Israel, there is a risk… that the nonplace of the ethical relation to the other becomes the 
place of Israeli’s borders.” (Critchley, 2004: 174). Moreover, the price for peace has 
been high. There is no doubt, that despite the initial historic and moral claims of the 
shoah survivors, the creation of the Israeli State led also to injustice committed on some 
of the original inhabitants of the land. What the proponents of the creation of the Jewish 
State understood as victory was a series of catastrophes to the Palestinians. The situation 
is too complex to take sides easily and there has even been resistance to the creation of 
the State of Israel on the side of the Jews. 
Aware of this problematic issue, Lévinas doesn’t forget to remind us that “A 
person is more holy than a land, even a holy land, faced with an affront made to a person, 
this holy land appears in its nakedness to be but stone and wood.“ (Lévinas, 1989: 297).  
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 V. The Idea of Civil Society 
V.1. A New Horizon of Questioning 
Twenty years ago, it might not have been too difficult to ask Lévinas himself 
what, according to him, was civil society. And maybe he encountered such a question 
during his academic career. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, Lévinas never 
directly addressed the topic of civil society in his works.75  
This thesis has now reached the point when philosophy becomes archeology. That 
is not to say, however, that an archeologist is forbidden to philosophize or that a 
philosopher cannot glue various potsherds together. But the more daring the quest, the 
more likely is it to go off-track. Not to mention the dangers of the ‘Lévinas Effect’ from 
which we are being warned by Alford: “The ability of Levinas’ texts to say anything the 
reader wants to hear.” (Alford, 2004: 146). 
In order to build a stable foundation for an attempt to explain civil society by 
using Lévinas’ terminology, I will first present Charles Taylor’s approach of interpreting 
this term. Taylor is known as a proponent of the communitarian movement. His political 
philosophy reflects the belief that society can be organized around the notion of a 
‘common good’, which is discussed and shared by all its members. Taylor uses a 
historical-structural approach in defining civil society, which is something quite foreign 
to Lévinas. For this reason, some aspects of Taylor’s concept of civil society will not be 
discussed.76 But the choice of Taylor’s concept is not random. Besides the reason that                                                         
75 The only exception being essay “Utopia and Socialism“, which is, in fact, a Preface to Martin Buber’s 
book Paths in Utopia (1945). The essay, which will also be analyzed in this thesis, is the preface to the 
1977 edition of Buber’s book. (Lévinas, 1999: 111-117). It remains a question beyond the scope of this 
thesis whether Lévinas’ not using the term ‘civil society’ was not connected to his general distrust of 
Hegel’s philosophy and the social revolts in 1960’s France that invoked Hegel to a certain extent. I will be 
more than interested in any evidence of Lévinas’ own interpretation of civil society. 
76 This especially applies to Taylor’s distinction between the L-Stream and M-Stream, which are two 
different approaches to the notion of civil society. The first one – named L-Stream after John Locke – 
believes that freedom is only secured in a civil society that is extrapolitical. Only in an opposition to the 
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Taylor’s concept of civil society is quite to the point and well argued, his sources of 
inspiration can be tracked down all the way to Franz Rosenzweig (1887-1929).77  
Following this introduction, I will try to re-interpret Taylor’s understanding of 
civil society by using the language of Lévinas’ philosophy. It is beyond the purposes of 
this thesis to describe the relationship between Lévinas and communitarism. Nor can it 
provide a comprehensive interpretation of Taylor’s social philosophy. Instead, it will try 
to pinpoint certain aspects of civil society that Taylor sees as defining. By outlining 
Taylor’s concept and then interpreting it in Lévinas’ terms, chapter V will connect a 
number of ‘clues’ that stood out as key in the analysis in chapters I – IV of this thesis. My 
goal is to answer the question: What place could civil society have in Lévinas’ 
philosophy? 
V.2. Taylor’s Concept of Civil Society 
In his 1992 essay “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” (Taylor, 1995: 257-
287), Taylor discusses what liberal society is and what makes it possible. According to 
Taylor, liberal society aims to put into practice the principles of equality and the rule of 
law, through which it secures freedom and the collective rule of citizens over their own                                                         
state can civil society raise claims and criticize the state. Montesquieu inspired the second approach. This 
line of thought that Taylor calls the M-Stream recognizes the importance of citizens’ role in governance 
and an unremovable monarchial government. In order to secure the rule of law, agencies, institutions and 
associations that are not part of the state, cooperate with the state. Taylor claims that there is an inherent 
tension between the L-Stream and the M-Stream (Taylor, 1995). 
77 In the Preface of Totality and Infinity Lévinas openly claims that Rosenzweig’s major work The Star of 
Redemption is “[T]oo often present [in Totality and Infinity] to be cited.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 28). Lévinas 
especially elaborates on Rosenzweig’s point of the irreducibility of beings and entities in the whole. The 
connection between Taylor and Rosenzweig is not direct, but it is significant, never-the-less. Rosenzweig 
was the student and friend of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888–1973), a leading Jewish intellectual and one 
of the early proponents of communitarian movement in the United States. His writings influenced the 
design and development of the Peace Corps. (Rosenstock Fund, 2007; Cristaudo, 2008). I would like to 
thank doc. PhDr. Zdeněk Pinc for pointing out to me the connection between Rosenstock-Huessy and 
communitarians. 
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affairs. In liberal society, civil society is one of the platforms for freedom. More 
specifically, “The notion of civil society comprises the host of free associations existing 
outside official sponsorship, and often dedicated to ends we generally consider 
nonpolitical.” (Taylor, 1995: 258). Only when these associations have an actual impact 
on the functioning of the society, can we, according to Taylor, speak of civil society. 
Civil society can be described on the basis of two elementary domains: the public sphere 
and the market economy. Taylor, therefore, belongs to the ‘maximalist’ schools of civil 
society theoreticians, because he claims that civil society is outside of the state but it 
includes economy (Müller, 2002: 68). 
The public sphere is a shared space for discussion over common concerns and 
purposes (Taylor, 1995: 262). Citizens are entitled to speak in a meta-topical space, 
where deliberation takes place without face-to-face meetings. Global mass media embody 
the connectedness of the metatopical space today. Ideas and opinions that emerge in the 
public sphere can influence the shaping of decisions and actions of the state.78 “[W]ith 
the modern public sphere comes the idea that political power must be supervised and 
checked by something outside.” (Taylor, 1995: 265). The market economy is the second 
space where freedom is nurtured within civil society – this time through the exchange of 
goods. Taylor points out that neither the public sphere nor the market economy can 
function wholly outside of the state. In the case of the former, participants of the public 
discussion often seek political power. In the case of the latter, without at least partial state 
regulations, collapse is inevitable. Never-the-less, claims Taylor, “these domains operate 
and are seen to operate by their own dynamic…” (Taylor, 1995: 272). 
V.3. Public Opinion according to Taylor 
Taylor sees in civil society an important value on its own and the most direct 
embodiment of this value lies in public opinion. Public opinion is “something that has 
been elaborated in debate and discussion.” (Taylor, 1995: 217). By voicing their 
opinions, citizens and local associations can influence national politics. Taylor highlights                                                         
78 “It has a normative status: government ought to listen to it.“ (Taylor, 1995: 263). 
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the achievements of the ‘new social movements’: feminist and environmental (Taylor, 
1995: 280). The public sphere should be allowed to participate in the political system.  
But there is one inherent problem: in large modern societies it is impossible to 
unite the discussion ‘under one roof’; public discussion has the tendency to disperse itself 
(Taylor, 1995: 274). The feeling of ‘belonging to’ the society is therefore lost and 
individualism prevails: people are thrown back on themselves (Taylor, 1995: 285). In 
order to ensure that decision-making is democratic, three conditions should be met. 
Firstly, individuals who form the society have to approve of shared end. Secondly, the 
voicing of opinions in the public discussion should be open to all groups and individuals 
and third, that decisions are based on the preferences of the majority (Taylor, 1995: 276). 
This is Taylor’s concept of civil society in a nutshell. Having interpreted the 
aspects that are, in his eyes, key for civil society, we can now return back to Lévinas and 
see how these aspects can be described in Lévinas’ terms. At the end of chapter V, I will 
present a Lévinasian, Taylor-inspired, definition of civil society. 
V.4. ‘Lévinasian’ Interpretation 
In order outline the discussion, let us start with a description of Taylor’s three 
conditions for democratic decision-making: approved shared ends, openness of the public 
discussion and decisions based on majority vote. 
The first condition – the creation of a common understanding between different 
people is partly analyzed in the chapter “Separation and Discourse” of Totality and 
Infinity (Lévinas, 1996a: 53-81). According to Lévinas, our understanding of the world is 
possible due to the pluralism of individual human lives. Discourse leads to a creation of 
objectivity and commonplaces; what is communicable is universally understandable 
(Lévinas, 1996a: 76). As was shown in chapter II of this thesis, discourse can be either 
ethical or violent. Ethical discourse means, “to give the world to the Other.” Violent 
discourse on the other hand, is such rhetoric that one uses to “usurp the Other’s place.” It 
seems to me that in the discussion over common goals, the modes of discourse that 
Lévinas describes are present. And the outcome of a discussion like this is an objective 
measure to judge the world; it can be an institution, a piece of legislature, or a procedure 
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of ‘doing things’. As we have seen in chapter IV of this thesis, it is, in fact, the 
institutionalization of justice in the State, which is initially driven by what I titled the idea 
of the third. Immediately, a problem arises: What if actual laws and institutions are 
unjust? This leads us to Taylor’s second condition. 
Taylor claims that all groups should be able to voice their opinions. This 
especially applies to marginalized groups. According to Lévinas, the State belongs to the 
universal inasmuch as it secures an equal utilization of its institutions to all. Lévinas 
agrees with Ricoeur that “one of the dangers of democracy [is] the permanent exclusion 
of a minority that always exists.” (Lévinas, 1998b: 205). Interpreting Lévinas’ reasoning 
further, we can add that in reality not all people have the same access to the State’s 
institutions and to justice. The State is too complex to allow for a comprehensive 
understanding of all its function and imperfect laws impose more violence than the 
‘elementary’ violence caused by the neglect of the third or fourth, who are also my 
Others (Lévinas, 2001b: 56). The State is also capable of declaring war, as a means of 
usurping the world. In addition to all of this violence and inflicted suffering, there are 
widows, beggars and orphans whom nobody looks in the face. 
In other words – and now I’m returning to Lévinas’ explicit formulations – the 
same distance between those who are close and those who are far-off should be kept 
(Lévinas, 1998a: 159). The far-off are the widows, orphans, beggars and other 
marginalized individuals and groups.79 And Lévinas adds that indifference to the 
suffering of the Other is scandalous (Lévinas, 1996b: 164). 
The last of Taylor’s three conditions for democratic decision-making is that 
preferences of the majority are the foundation for decisions. As far as I know, Lévinas 
does not address this point in his works. We have to settle for his more general remarks 
on democracy, which he understands to be the only suitable regime. Voting is key for 
getting rid of unjust rulers. “Once we choose another tyrant, we imagine, of course, that 
he will be better than his predecessor. We say this with each election!” (Lévinas, 2001b: 
194).                                                         
79 According to Alford’s interpretation, the far-off are the poor, the hungry, the naked and the homeless, 
who “cannot fight for their own being, who are absent from the state.” (Alford, 2004: 166). 
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Using Taylor’s description of civil society as a template, I believe that Lévinasian 
concept of civil society can be built (and thought through) on four pillars. These are: a) 
prophetic politics, b) charity and hospitality, c) the rights of man and d) commerce. In my 
opinion, they all reflect a very specific relation between ethics and politics. 
V.5. Pillar I: Prophetic Politics 
In chapters II and III of this thesis, I showed that there is an oscillation between 
ethics and politics in Lévinas’ philosophy. What implications does this oscillation have 
for Lévinasian notion of civil society? 
In the essay titled “Five Problems in Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of 
a Solution to them“ Simon Critchley takes an almost provocative standpoint when 
analyzing Lévinas’ political opinions: “Ethics is ethics for the sake of politics. Better 
stated perhaps, ethics is the metapolitical disturbance of politics for the sake of politics, 
that is, for the sake of a politics that does not close over in itself, becoming what Levinas 
would call totality, becoming a whole.” (Critchley, 2004: 182). Such standpoint would, in 
fact, mean, that politics is ‘above’ ethics, that ethics is only secondary. 
First of all, it seems that Lévinas – though not always explicitly – claims that 
ethics holds a primary place over politics. In chapter II of this thesis, I elaborated on this 
issue: according to Lévinas, “The Good is above being.“ (Lévinas, 1998a: 122). 
Secondly, as was presented, in chapter IV, the State and all of its institutions are by 
nature political. If we extrapolate Lévinas’ thesis from the Preface of Totality and 
Infinity, all politics participate in the totality (Lévinas, 1996a: 21-30). Even in the liberal 
State where citizens enjoy certain rights and freedoms, laws can become tyrannizing. 
They were established in order to judge and measure between all Others, which is the 
very meaning of the idea of the third. In fact, it might be exactly due to some laws that 
people are ‘pushed aside’ and deprived of the possibility to defend themselves. After all, 
it is not the role of the State to sustain the ethical relationship in its partiality as an 
endless responsibility of the-one-for-the-other.  
On the other hand, Critchley touches an important point: there need to exist ways 
of ‘correcting’ the State. And Lévinas does call for a radical reflection and continuous 
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rehabilitation of the State: through skepticism, every citizen is called to be a ‘prophet’. 
The divine wisdom of philosophy can protect us from the tyranny of the State (Lévinas, 
1987: 23). In chapter II of this thesis, I interpreted Lévinas’ term skepticism as the means 
of reverting the said into the saying. The saying signifies the break-up of consciousness 
(Lévinas , 1998a: 165). This is the core of ‘prophetic politics’, which is a name Caygill 
gives to a concept outlined by Lévinas in his later works (Lévinas, 1998a: 149-152; 
Caygill, 2002: 128-158). 
I believe that Lévinas’ prophetic politics is in alignment with Taylor’s 
understanding of public opinion as something that comes outside of the State but that can 
correct the State. According to Lévinas, the primordial ethical event of the encounter with 
the other person’s face breaks through the totality of the State and through politics in 
general. It is, therefore, from a position outside of the State that ethics enable corrections 
of the State. Moreover, the key importance of public opinion and the freedom of speech, 
lies in the fact that they can be used in the defense of the Other (Lévinas, 2001b: 183). 
There are tears “that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other (Autrui).” (Lévinas, 
1996b: 23). Public opinion can point to the cases of injustice and demand corrections. 
Mass media play a significant role in this sense: “I know of no frightening images than 
some of the scenes of African life shown on television; and those children! Nothing is 
nobler than exposing man’s misery.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 190). 
I believe it can be said that in Lévinas’ opinion, everyone is called to be a prophet 
and to question politics. One can interpret Lévinas’ claim from Totality and Infinity that 
the pluralism of individual human lives implies radical alterity (Lévinas, 1996a: 121); 
that there is also pluralism in prophecy going against the unity of the State. This, I 
believe, is the heart of civil society. The justice of the State is rigorous in its universality, 
but there exist a possibility for the reconsideration of all verdicts. “To soften this justice, 
to listen to this appeal, is each person’s role. It is in that sense that one has to speak of a 
return to charity and mercy.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 68). This leads us to the second pillar of 
‘Lévinasian civil society’. 
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V.6. Pillar II: The Rights of Man 
In chapter III of this thesis, I interpreted Lévinas’ understanding of the rights of 
man in a two-fold way: they can either exist as an integral part of the State – as laws – or 
they can be thought of in respect to the Other. In the case of the former, rights of man are 
embedded in the State legislature as mandatory rules. Misconduct is sanctioned; justice 
calls for an equal treatment of all in front of the law.  
In the case of the latter, we can understand human rights as “the rights of the 
Other.” (Lévinas, 1999: 127). In this sense they can be corrective to the State. Since such 
correction – or disturbance, to use Critchley’s term (Critchley, 2004: 182) – can only be 
inflicted from the outside, rights of man in the latter sense fall within the borders of civil 
society, which is separate from the State. And Lévinas himself confirms this approach to 
understanding human rights: “The concern for the rights of man is not a function of the 
State; it is in the state an institution which is not of the State; it is the call of humanity, 
which is not yet accomplished in the State.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 68). 
In an interview with François Poirié, Lévinas briefly elaborates on the issue of 
human rights movements. “Movements with regard to the rights of man proceed from 
what I call the consciousness that justice is not yet just enough.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 52). I 
believe that the phrase “justice not yet just enough” is another way of saying that some 
people are still far-off: their voices are not being heard. Proponents of human rights react 
to the State’s insufficiency in maintaining the rights of man institutionalized in politics as 
laws. Through freedom of speech they influence public opinion in a process of turning 
the rights of man as the “rights of the other man” into rights of man as universal and 
enforceable laws. And it seems that Lévinas would be in favor of such attempts. “This is 
perhaps the very excellence of democracy, whose fundamental liberalism corresponds to 
the ceaseless deep remorse of justice: legislation always unfinished, always resumed, a 
legislation open to the better.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 206). 
As I see it, these are the practical implications of Lévinas’ notion of the rights of 
man. They are closely linked with prophetic politics as a means of correcting the State. 
But advocating efforts for my neighbor’s rights do not exhaust a possible definition of 
civil society. They are only secondary to individual calls to responsibility. The next step 
is ‘doing something for my neighbor.’ 
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“Lodge a stranger with you, and he will subvert your course, and make a 
stranger of you to your own household.” (Sirach 11,34) 
V.7. Pillar III: Charity and Hospitality 
In the description of the third pillar of Lévinas-inspired notion of civil society, we 
have to step out of the framework defined by Taylor. In my opinion, we are now coming 
to the point that Lévinas did not develop fully in relation to politics, but that is implied in 
his writings. But again, the notes below are a mere interpretation, since Lévinas did not 
theorize civil society. 
Reading through Lévinas’ description of the encounter with the face of the Other 
in Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than Being and other works, one cannot but wonder: 
What happens after I am confronted with the misery of my neighbor – with his/her 
vulnerability, mortality and weakness? According to Lévinas, I am infinitely responsible 
for my neighbor – even for his/her responsibility. The Other calls me to tear away the 
bread that I’m eating and nourish his/her hunger instead of my own hunger (Lévinas, 
1998a: 56). And in fact the face of a widow, orphan or beggar that signifies the 
vulnerability of one’s face can be a face of an actual widow, orphan or beggar whom I 
meet in the street. “I am always dealing with a multitude of persons, and consequently, 
these relations between persons and the context of the situation have to be taken into 
account. That is what limits, not my responsibility, but my action, modifying them 
modalities of my obligations.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 55). 
Prophetic politics and the rights of man, which I defined as the first two pillars of 
a possible ‘Lévinasian’ notion of civil society, emphasize the need for the far-off to be 
heard and defended against the institutions of the State. Every person has a different 
‘starting’ position and a sudden accident can change the face of a well-established 
individual. In other words, everyone’s life is unique; because of their egalitarian nature, 
the State’s institutions can never fully address the needs of each individual. 
For this reason, I believe that charitable institutions that provide care and 
hospitality to people in need should be included in the Lévinasian concept of civil 
society. In his works, Lévinas emphasizes the importance of hospitality in the Jewish 
 59 
tradition and he applies it to his ethics as well. The being-obsessed-by-the-other does not 
end with mere feelings of guilt for not fulfilling the infinite responsibility I am called for. 
Action can and does result from it. I claim that civil society is also dependent on the acts 
of charity of individuals and organizations. Organized charity oscillates between ethics 
and politics; it can never replace the face-to-face meeting.80 But Lévinas himself has 
made remarks that could be interpreted as his approval of such ‘institutionalizing of 
ethics’. For example, in the interview “In the Name of the Other”, he underlines the 
importance of technology: “I claim that without technology we would be in no position to 
feed the Third World.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 190). 
V.8. Pillar IV. Commerce  
Lastly, let us turn our attention to the economical aspects of civil society. 
According to Taylor, society can be seen as an “economy”, as “an entity of interrelated 
acts of production, exchange, and consumption which has its own internal dynamic, its 
own autonomous laws.” (Taylor, 1995: 215). Taylor considers both the market economy 
and public opinion to be constitutive domains of civil society. 
The topic of free exchange of goods is not foreign to Lévinas. In the essay “The 
Ego and the Totality”, Lévinas pays special attention to commerce: “In transactions there 
occurs an action of one freedom on another. Money, whose metaphysical significance has 
perhaps not yet been measured… corrupts the will by the power it offers it, and thus is a 
middle term par excellence.” (Lévinas, 1987: 45. Emphasis in the original text). Money 
allows the quantification of man and commodities. It also offers a new way of solving 
disputes: as a fine, reparation or compensation. 81 According to Lévinas, money brings 
about justice (Lévinas, 1987: 45). “Barter and trade are, on the contrary, a source of                                                         
80 It might be for this reason that Lévinas claims in Existence and Existents that “There is no greater 
hypocrisy than that which invented well tempered charity.“ (Lévinas, 2001a: 61). I believe that this claim 
has to be understood in the context of Lévinas’ belief in primary role of ethics. 
81 It is not without importance that money is something Heidegger failed to address. Lévinas sees this as a 
sort of proof of Heidegger’s prejudice: “I think that the notion of exchange as such reflected too explicitly 
on the Jews.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 190). 
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confrontations and war. And money is the end of barter and trade.” (Lévinas, 2001b: 
184). 
V.9. ‘Lévinasian Definition’ of Civil Society 
In the four pillars described above there exist a certain dynamic between ethics 
and politics, which can again be best described by the term oscillation. It is a movement 
from the face-to-face meeting with the Other to an institutionalization of ethics; another 
word for such institutionalization is ‘politics’. In the case of prophetic politics, we see an 
attempt to infuse the State with ethics; the State can be changed in reaction to skepticism 
(the voiced opinion of individuals or the whole public) but it still remains political. In 
fact, changes done to the State become other institutions. The rights of man can be 
understood as either “the rights of the Other” or as laws. The initial concern for the Other 
reflected in the former can become part of the official list of rights the State guarantees to 
all its citizens. On the other hand, even the most rigidly followed laws allow for an 
interpretation that “looks at the Other’s face”. Hospitality starts out in the exclusive 
relation of the Same and its Other, but can turn into organized charity. Lastly, economic 
transactions prevent war, but have their institutions as well. 
We have now come to the point of presenting a ‘Lévinasian’ definition of civil 
society. The four pillars will serve as a basis for such an attempt. The definition is thus 
only a more compact summary of the above. I claim that the following definition of civil 
society could be drawn from Lévinas’ philosophy: 
 
Civil society is the sphere of interpersonal relations, actions and 
institutions whose primary location is outside of the State, which correct 
the State by prophetic politics, through the defense of the rights of the 
Other, which provide charity and hospitality to the far-off and in which 
free exchange of goods takes place; civil society oscillates between ethics 
and politics. 
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It can also be added that the liberal democratic State provides such political 
arrangement, which is most favorable for the functioning of civil society. Moreover, I 
believe that Lévinasian civil society should be maximalist like Taylor’s: in order to 
influence (or correct) the State it is primarily situated outside of it.82 
V.10. The Other Side of Civil Society 
It would be misleading to think of civil society as the place of ‘holiness’. In 
reality, selfish intentions tend to penetrate all human actions. Such is the fate of civil 
society as well. Prophetic politics can turn from a defense of one’s neighbor to the 
defense of one’s personal interests. In terms of human rights, if they are not understood 
as the “rights of the Other”, the, what Simmons calls ‘burgeoning’, can take place 
(Simmons, 2003: 50). Charity and hospitality without ethics can become routine in the 
sense that they stop caring for the Other and instead they become activities ‘for 
themselves’. Inclination to money and/or material goods can disrupt the peace it was 
created to establish (Lévinas, 2001b: 184). After all, Lévinas claims quite strictly in the 
essay “Ethics and Spirit” that “Possession denies independent existence. To have is to 
refuse to be.” (Lévinas, 1997a: 9). 
Like in the State, politics can gain the edge on ethics. “Politics left to itself bears 
a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the other who have given rise to it, for it 
judges them according to universal rules and thus as in absentia.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 300). 
What initially started as an opposition to the State can revert to an alignment with the 
State. Civil society institutions can be devoured by the State and become part of it.  
Another question is how civil society institutions perform ‘corrections’ of the 
State. In their efforts, civil society institutions can adopt PEITHEIN – the violent discourse 
already discussed in chapter II of this thesis. And the pursuit of power in economic and 
political terms can easily overshadow the face, inflicting harm and violence to the Other. 
This way, civil society institutions can enclose themselves within the totality as the                                                         
82 The difference between civil society and the state is a Hegelian motive. According to Müller, many 
theoreticians consider Hegel to the first one to have made such a distinction (Müller, 2002: 37). 
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gatherers of resources and power. “This adding up of the sum total is the economic life, 
absolutely: precisely there, the face plays no role, human beings are terms…” (Lévinas, 
2001b: 142). Civil society can thus participate on the materialization of the human. The 
imposing of social pressures by civil society institutions can become tyrannizing as much 
as the State. 
V.11. A Jewish Civil Society? 
At the end of chapter IV, I outlined Lévinas’ opinions about the State of Israel. 
Lévinas believed that the State is necessary for the Jews as a dwelling from which they 
can stand out in responsibility for their neighbors. At the same time he was critical to the 
radical Zionist movement. In this chapter it is tempting to ask: Are there any clues in his 
works, which would tell more about the relationship between Judaism and civil society? 
First of all, it is important to emphasize that prophetic politics and hospitality and 
charity, which I defined as two of the four pillars of ‘Lévinasian civil society’ are 
inspired by the Jewish tradition. The role of prophets in the Bible has already been 
described. Also hospitality and charity can be interpreted as variations of the Biblical 
commandment – which Lévinas uses in his ethics – “Thou shalt not kill”.83  
In addition to these more general comments it is possible to find some ‘clues’ in 
Lévinas’ preface to Buber’s book Paths in Utopia. Here Lévinas through some of 
Buber’s arguments. According to Lévinas, Buber sees in socialism the pursuit for “…The 
regeneration of ‘cells’ of the social issue, broken down by politics.” (Lévinas, 1999: 114). 
The attempts to establish a functioning socialist society throughout history have not been 
successful. For example, the Soviet Revolution was driven by the vision of a classless 
society without political powers. But instead it produced one of the most centralized and 
tyrannical powers the World has ever witnessed.  
                                                        
83 If one thinks to the limit, one can say that I am responsible for the death of the other. I cannot leave him 
alone to die, even if I cannot stop it. This is how I have always interpreted the ‘Thou shalt not kill.‘“ 
(Lévinas, 2001b: 53). 
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Buber, however, gives one example of socialist society that, according to him, 
was a non-failure: the Kibbutzim in Israel. In his preface, Lévinas is not quite sure 
whether this is the case. But if we leave the topic of socialism, could the Kibbutzim also 
serve as an example of civil society within Judaism? I do not feel competent enough to 
answer this question. A more thorough study would be required. But I wanted to outline 
it as a question for possible future investigation. 
„Peace, peace to the far and the near, says the LORD; and I will heal 
them.“ (Isaiah, 57:19) 
V.12. Fraternity and Peace 
There is another possibility by which we are, again, not duped according to 
Lévinas (Lévinas, 1996a: 21). It is the possibility of peace within fraternity. The ontology 
of war can be overturned if proximity enters human lives and actions. In this regard, what 
could be said of civil society? Is it a domain of ethics or war? 
Interpreting Lévinas one step further, I believe that if there is an oscillation 
between ethics and politics in civil society as I defined it in the previous parts of this 
chapter, then there is a possibility of both war and peace. But as long as a small gate 
opens for responsibility, proximity, charity, hospitality, the saying, substitution and 
diachrony, then the prophetic word coming from civil society can help establish solidarity 
between people. “It is my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely 
foreign… that constitutes the original fact of fraternity.” (Lévinas, 1996a: 214). To this 
we can add Lévinas’ analysis of the linkage between ethics and politics: “Unfortunately, 
contradictions… between morals and politics are not only resolved in the reflections of 
philosophers. It takes events, that is, human lived experience.” (Lévinas, 1989: 293). 
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Conclusion 
It is possible to build a Lévinasian definition of civil society. This is what I 
believe and what I have tried to present in this thesis. The task required a summary of 
Lévinas’ thinking on ethics and politics, between which human lived experience 
oscillates. While ethics are founded in the idea of the Infinite, politics start out with what 
I titled the idea of the third. In Lévinasian politics, the State has the role of deciding, who 
is to be given preference. This way the State is constructed on the limitation of 
responsibility. In order to think through the implications for civil society, which is 
otherwise absent in Lévinas’ works, I had to turn to other authors. Taylor’s concept of 
civil society, though based on different grounds than Lévinas’ philosophy, was used with 
this aim in mind. In chapter V of the thesis I then constructed a civil society concept 
using Lévinas’ terms. 
I believe that Lévinas’ thought allows for a construction of civil society that is 
based on four main pillars: prophetic politics, rights of man, charity, and commerce. It is 
‘maximalist’ because it is separate from the State but coherent with the market economy. 
In it, there is an on-going oscillation between ethics and politics. By the means of 
prophetic politics, civil society can correct injustice caused by the State, whose laws are 
always incomplete and imperfect. On the other hand, civil society itself tends to revert to 
politics by a variety of ways. But as long as a small gate opens for proximity, 
responsibility, diachrony, substitution, re-saying of the said, hospitality and charity, peace 
can prevail as the fraternity of man. 
 What could be the uses of the Lévinasian definition of civil society that I have 
presented in this thesis? First of all, the definition highlights the continuous oscillation 
between ethics and politics. It is a reminder that civil society institutions and their 
representatives can have political ambition – and, in fact, the nature of civil society is 
such that it cannot do without politics (at least in Lévinas’ understanding of the term 
politics). Civil society, therefore, should not be thought of as the sphere of selfless 
individuals who only take responsibility of the far-off. And as was shown in chapter II of 
the thesis, with every meeting with the Other’s face, consciousness wakes up in the form 
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of the ideas of the third. A limitation of individual responsibility is unavoidable, because 
one has to make judgments and choices. 
Secondly, in my opinion, civil society has to be thought of in difference to the 
State. Lévinas’ philosophy provides arguments for the Generalist notion that civil society 
should be used a better term for democracy (see Müller, 2002: 68). Of, course, there are 
linkages between civil society and the State – and this is what connects Lévinas’ and 
Taylor’s understanding. But in order for civil society to be able to ‘correct’ the State there 
has to be a ‘prophet’ who is not part of the State. I have shown that this is the core of 
prophetic politics, which is very much connected to public opinion. 
Lastly, I believe that the understanding of civil society presented here can help 
enlighten the logic behind the always-interrupting question of who goes first? In Lévinas’ 
words: Who should be addressed by our after you! [aprés-vous]? The term the idea of the 
third can be illustrative in this regard. We can see this in the example of the catastrophic 
earthquake that hit Haiti in January 2010. Immediately, the global media raised 
awareness of the human suffering there and people from all around the world started 
contributing money to support humanitarian aid in Haiti. What was the donor’s 
motivation? Did those who made a donation feel that if something so terrible happened to 
them, the world would help as well? Maybe. But perhaps we can interpret this situation 
by using Lévinas’ terms. I think it is reasonable to say that after the earthquake, Haitians 
have become “the third“ to many people around the world. In other words, many people 
considered the victims of the catastrophe while making conscious calculations of who 
should be given preference. But even though politics can have the last word, it does not 
always have to be the case. Lévinas always makes a point of reminding us that the said 
can be reverted into the saying. Returning to our example, I believe that Haitians have – 
even if only for a short while – become ‘the Others’ for those who supported their cause 
in responsibility. And after all, isn’t responsibility just another name for love? 
 
 
 

 67 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources84 
 (A) Essays and Articles by Emmanuel Lévinas 
Listed Alphabetically by titles 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “Assimilation and New Culture”. In Seán Hand (ed.). The 
Lévinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 283-288. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2007a. “The Bible and the Greeks“. In In the Time of Nations. New 
York: Continuum. pp. 119-121. (Lévinas, 2007a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1987. “The Ego and the Totality“. In Collected Philosophical 
Papers. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 25-45. (Lévinas, 1987) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1997a. “Ethics and Spirit”. In Difficult Freedom. Essays on 
Judaism, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. pp. 3-10. (Lévinas, 1997a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1987. “Freedom and Command”. In Collected Philosophical 
Papers. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 15-23. (Lévinas, 1987) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1997a. “Freedom of Speech”. In Difficult Freedom. Essays on 
Judaism. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. pp. 205-207. (Lévinas, 1997a) 
 
                                                        
84 The bibliography is divided into: primary sources – (A) Essays and Articles by Emmanuel Lévinas, (B) 
Books and Volumes by Emmanuel Lévinas, and (C) Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas – and secondary 
sources – (D) Books, Volumes and Essays by other authors, and (E) Internet Sources. The reason for this 
arrangement is that the Bibliography can then better serve as a recherché for this thesis. 
  68 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2006. “Humanism and An-archy“. In Humanism of the Other. 
Champaign: University of Illinois Press, pp. 45-57. (Lévinas, 2006) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “Ideology and Idealism”. In Seán Hand (ed.). The Lévinas 
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 235-248. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2007b. “‘In the Image of God,‘ according to Rabbi Hayyim 
Volozhiner“. In Beyond the Verse. New York: Continuum. pp. 148-163. (Lévinas, 2007b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1996b. “Peace and Proximity”. In Basic Philosophical Writings. 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. pp. 161-169. (Lévinas, 1996b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “Politics After!“ In Seán Hand (ed.). The Lévinas Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 277-283. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “Prayer without Demand”. In Seán Hand (ed.). The Lévinas 
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 227-234. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1999. “The Prohibition against Representation and ‘The Rights of 
Man‘“. In Alterity and Transcendence. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 121-
130. (Lévinas, 1999) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1990. “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism“. Critical Inquiry 
17 (1): 63-71. (Lévinas, 1990) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1998b. “The Rights of Man and Good Will“. In Entre nous. 
Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 155-158. (Lévinas, 
1998b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1994. “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other”. In Outside 
the Subject. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 116-125. (Lévinas, 1994) 
 69 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1999. “The Rights of the Other Man”. In Alterity and 
Transcendence. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 145-149. (Lévinas, 1999) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “The State of Caesar and the State of David“. In Seán Hand 
(ed.). The Lévinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 268-277. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1997a. “The State of Israel and the Religion of Israel”. In Difficult 
Freedom. Essays on Judaism. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. pp. 216-220. 
(Lévinas, 1997a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1999. “Totality and Totalization”. In Alterity and Transcendence. 
New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 39-51. (Lévinas, 1999) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1996b. “Transcendence and Height”. In Basic Philosophical 
Writings. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. pp. 11-31. (Lévinas, 1996b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1996b. “Transcendence and Intelligibility”. In Basic Philosophical 
Writings. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. pp. 149-159. (Lévinas, 1996b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1999. “Utopia and Socialism”. In Alterity and Transcendence. New 
York: Columbia University Press. pp. 111-117. (Lévinas, 1999) 
 
 
  70 
(B) Books and Volumes by Emmanuel Lévinas 
Listed Alphabetically by titles85 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 1997d. Čas a jiné. Le temps et l’autre [Time and the Other]. 
Liberec: Dauphin. 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 2009. Etika a nekonečno [Ethics and Infinity]. Praha: Oikoymenh. 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 2001a. Existence and Existents. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press. (Lévinas, 2001a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 1997c. Existence a ten, kdo existuje [Existence and Existents]. 
Praha: Oikoymenh. 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1996a. Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press. (Lévinas, 1996a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2006. Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité [Totality and Infinity. 
An Essay on Exteriority]. Paris: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 1997b. Totalita a Nekonečno: Esej o exterioritě [Totality and 
Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority]. Praha: Oikoymenh. (Lévinas, 1997b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1998a. Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (Lévinas, 1998a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2006. Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence [Otherwise than 
Being, or, Beyond Essence]. Paris: Kluwer Academic.                                                         
85 Titles without quoting brackets are not directly quoted or referred to in the thesis but they influenced it, 
never-the-less. This especially applies to translations of the original French text into Czech. 
 71 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1994. Outside the Subject. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
(Lévinas, 1994) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1999. Alterity and Transcendence. New York: Columbia University 
Press. (Lévinas, 2006) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1996b. Basic Philosophical Writings. Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press. (Lévinas, 1996b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2007b. Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures. New 
York: Continuum. (Lévinas, 2007b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1997a. Difficult Freedom. Essays on Judaism. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press. (Lévinas, 1997a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 1987. Collected Philosophical Papers. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. (Lévinas, 1987) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 1998b. Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia 
University Press. (Lévinas, 1998b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 2006a. Humanism of the Other. Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press. (Lévinas, 2006a) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel, 2007a. In the Time of Nations. New York: Continuum.           
(Lévinas, 2007a) 
 
  72 
(C) Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas 
Listed Alphabetically by titles 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “The Awakening of the I”. Interview with Roger Pol-Droit. 
In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, pp. 182-187. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Being-for-the-Other”. Interview with Jean-Christophe 
Aeschlimann. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel 
Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 114-120. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1998b. “Dialogue on Thinking-of-the-Other”. Interview with Jöel 
Doutreleau and Pierre Zalio. In Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia 
University Press. pp. 201-206. (Lévinas, 1998b)  
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. “Ethics and Politics“. Interview with Salomon Malka and 
Alain Finkielkraut. In Seán Hand (ed.). The Lévinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 289-
297. (Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “In the Name of the Other”. Interview with Luc Ferry, 
Raphaël Hadas-Lebel, and Sylvaine Pasquier. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? 
Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 188-199. 
(Lévinas, 2001b) 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Intention, Event, and the Other”. Interview with Christoph 
von Wolzogen. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel 
Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 140-157. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Interview with François Poirié“. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it 
Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 23-83. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 73 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Interview with Myriam Anissimov”. In Jill Robbins (ed.). 
Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 84-92. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Interview with Salomon Malka”. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it 
Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 93-102. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “The Other, Utopia, and Justice” (Interview with Jasques 
Message and Joel Roman). In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with 
Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 200-210. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “The Philosopher and Death”. Interview with Christian 
Chabanis. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 121-129. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1998b. “Philosophy, Justice, and Love”. Interview with R. Fornet 
and A. Gomez. In Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia University 
Press. pp. 103-121. (Lévinas, 1998b) 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2001b. “Proximity of the Other”. Interview with Anne-Catherine 
Benchelah. In Jill Robbins (ed.). Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel 
Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 211-218. (Lévinas, 2001b) 
 
  74 
Secondary Sources 
(D) Books, Volumes and Essays by other authors 
Listed alphabetically by authors86  
Alford, Fred, C. 2004. “Levinas and Political Theory“. Political Theory, 32 (2): 146-171. 
(Alford, 2004) 
 
Buber, Martin. 1969. Já a ty [I and Thou]. Praha: Mladá Fronta. (Buber, 1969) 
 
Bouretz, Pierre. 2009. Svědkové budoucího času III. Strauss, Jonas, Lévinas [Witnesses 
of the Time to Come III. Strauss, Jonas, Lévinas]. Praha: Oikoymenh. (Bouretz, 2009) 
 
Casper, Bernhard. 1998. Míra lidství: Rosenzweig a Lévinas [The Measure of the Human: 
Rosenzweig and Lévinas]. Praha: Oikoymenh. 
 
Casper, Bernhard. 2000. Událost modlitby. Základní linie hermeneutiky náboženského 
dění [The Event of Prayer. The Elementary Hermeneutics of Religious Events]. Praha: 
Vyšehrad. 
 
Caygill, Howard. 2002. Levinas and the Political. London: Routledge. (Caygill, 2002) 
 
Chaliér, Catherine. 1993. O filosofii Emmanuela Lévinase: s úvodní studií Jeana Lacroix 
[On the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas: with an introductory study by Jean Lacroix]. 
Praha: Vyšehrad, 1993. 
 
Chaliér, Catherine. 1992. Židovská jedinečnost a filosofie [Jewish Uniqueness and 
Philosophy]. Praha: Filosofický Ústav ČSAV.                                                         
86 Titles without quoting brackets are not directly quoted or referred to in the thesis but they influenced it, 
never-the-less. Volumes marked with ‘*‘ are quoted in the thesis body under Lévinas’ name. 
 75 
 
Critchley, Simon. 2004. “Five Problems in Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of a 
Solution to them“. Political Theory, 32 (2): 172-185. (Critchley, 2004) 
 
Descombes, Vincent. 2005. Stejné a jiné. Čtyřicet pět let francouzské filosofie (1933-
1978) [The Same and the Other. Fourty-five years of French Philosophy (1933-1978)]. 
Praha: Oikoymenh. (Descombes, 2005) 
 
Hand, Shawn (ed.). 1989. The Lévinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. (*Lévinas, 1989) 
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1992. Základy filosofie práva [The Philosophy of 
Right]. Praha: Academia. 
 
Müller, Karel. 2002. Češi a občanská společnost. Pojem, problémy, východiska [Czechs 
and Civil Society. Attempt of Conceptualization, Problems, Possible Solutions]. Praha: 
Triton. (Müller, 2002) 
 
Pohořalá, Magdalena. 2005. Hvězda vykoupení Franze Rosenzweiga a její stopy v díle 
Emmanuela Lévinase Totalita a nekonečno – tematizace Boha [Franz Rosenzweig’s Star 
of Redemption and its traces in the works of Emmanuel Lévinas – thematization of God]. 
Unpublished bachelor’s thesis. Praha: Charles University, Faculty of Humanities.  
 
Poláková, Jolana. 1995. Filosofie dialogu (Rosenzweig, Ebner, Buber, Lévinas) [The 
Philosophy of Dialogue (Rozenweig, Ebner, Buber, Lévinas)]. Praha: Ježek.      
(Poláková, 1995) 
 
Plato. 1937. Faidros [Phaedrus]. Praha: Jan Laichter. 
 
Robbins, Jill (ed.). 2001. Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. (*Lévinas, 2001) 
 
  76 
Simmons, William, Paul. 2003. An-Archy and Justice. An Introduction to Emmanuel 
Levinas’s Political Thought. Lanham: Lexington Books. (Simmons, 2003) 
 
Skovajsa, Marek. 2006. ”Lidská práva v myšlení Emmanuela Lévinase“ [“Emmanuel 
Levinas‘ thinking about human rights”]. In Kružík, Josef; Novotný Karel (eds.). 2006. 
Emmanuel Lévinas - filosofie a výchova: ke stému výročí narození Emmanuela Lévinase 
[Emmanuel Lévinas. Philosophy and Upbringing: To the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of 
Emmanuel Lévinas]. Praha: Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta humanitních studií, pp. 185-197. 
(Skovajsa, 2006) 
 
Taylor, Charles. 1995. “Invoking Civil Society“. In Philosophical Arguments. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 204-224. (Taylor, 1995) 
 
Taylor, Charles. 1995. “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere“. In Philosophical 
Arguments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 257-287. (Taylor, 1995) 
 
 
(E) Internet Sources 
Listed alphabetically by authors 
Bergo, Bettina. 2007. “Emmanuel Levinas”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
[online]. Stanford: Stanford University [viewed on November 26, 2009]. Available at: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas>. (Bergo, 2007) 
 
Cristaudo, Wayne. 2008. “Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy [online]. Stanford: Stanford University [viewed on February 8, 2010]. 
Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rosenstock-huessy>. (Cristaudo, 2008) 
 
 77 
Descartes, René. 1996. Meditations on First Philosophy. [online]. S.l. [quoted on January 
4, 2010]. Available at: <http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/intro.html>.       
(Descartes, 1996) 
 
The Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund. 2007. “Bibliography of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy” 
[online]. Essex (USA): The Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund [viewed on February 18, 
2010]. Available at: <http://www.argobooks.org/biography.html>.                  
(Rosenstock Fund, 2007) 
 
Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society. 2009. The Levinas Online Bibliography. Primary and 
Secondary Sources (1929-2009) [online database]. Utrecht: Dutch-Flemish Levinas 
Society [viewed continuously]. Available at: <http://www.levinas.nl>.                  
(Levinas Online Bibliography, 2009) 
 
Maccoby, Hyam. 1996. “Obituary: Emmanuel Levinas“. The Independent [online]. 
London: The Independend, January 3, 1996 [viewed on January 4, 2010]. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-emmanuel-levinas-1322175.html> 
(Maccoby, 1996) 
 
The New American Bible [online]. Washington: United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops [viewed continuously]. Available at: 
<http://www.usccb.org/nab/bible/index.shtml>. 
 
Wilkes, Donald, E. Jr.. 1998. “J’accuse…! Emile Zola, Alfred Dreyfus and the Greatest 
Newspaper Article in History”. Athens: University of Georgia, February 11, 1998 
[viewed on February 18, 2010]. Available at: 
<http://www.law.uga.edu/academics/profiles/dwilkes_more/his9_jaccuse.html>.  
(Wilkes, 1998) 

  I 
Annexes 
 
a) Titles by E. Lévinas Listed Chronologically 
b) Emmanuel Lévinas – Short Biography 
c) Charles Taylor – Short Biography 
d) Author’s Profile 
e) Index 
 
a) Titles by E. Lévinas Listed Chronologically 
Listed chronologically by years of first publishing87 
Legend: 
a – article / essay 
b – book 
 
1934 a Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism 
  (Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l'hitlérisme) 
   
1947 b Existence and Existant 
  (De l'existence à l'existant) 
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1952 a Ethique et esprit 
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87 The table only contains titles used as sources for this thesis. The Levinas Online Bibliography was served 
as a source of original French titles (Levinas Online Bibliography, 2009). 
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1953 a Freedom and Command 
  (Liberté et Commandement) 
   
1954 a The Ego and the Totality 
  (Le moi et la totalité) 
   
1957 a Freedom of Speech 
  (Liberté de parole) 
   
1961 b Totality and Infnity. Essey on Exteriority 
  (Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité) 
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1963 b Difficult Freedom. Essays on Judaism 
  (Difficile Liberté. Essais sur le Judaïsme) 
   
1968 a Humanism and An-archy 
  (Humanisme at an-archie) 
   
1968 a Totality and Totalization 
  (Totalité et totalisation) 
   
1971 a The State of Caesar and the State of David 
  (L'état de César et l'état de David) 
   
1972 b Humanism of the Other 
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1973 a Ideology and Idealism 
  (Idéologie et idéalisme) 
   
1974 b Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence 
  (Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence) 
   
 III 
1977 a ‘In the Image of God,‘ according to Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner 
  ('A l'image, de Dieu', d'après Rabbi Haïm Voloziner) 
   
1977 a Utopie et socialisme 
  (Utopia and Socialism) 
   
1977 a ‘In the Image of God‘, according to Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner 
  ('A l'image, de Dieu', d'après Rabbi Haïm Voloziner) 
   
1979 a Politics After! 
  (Politique après!) 
   
1980 a Assimilation and New Culture 
  (Assimilation et culture nouvelle) 
   
1982 b Ethics and Infinity 
  (Ethique et Infini) 
   
1982 b Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures  
  (L'au-delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques) 
   
1984 a The Prohibition against Representation and 'The Rights of Man‘ 
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1986 a The Bible and the Greeks 
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b) Emmanuel Lévinas – Short Biography 
(1906-1995) 
Born in Kaunas, Lithuania (then Russia) in 1906. In 1923 he moved to Strasbourg 
to study philosophy and since 1929 he attended Husserl’s lectures in Freiburg. He was 
mobilized into the French army and in 1939 was captured by the Nazi forces. As a 
prisoner of war he was not persecuted due to his Jewish background, but some of his 
closest family died in concentration camps. Since the end of World War II, he was 
actively involved in setting up Jewish schools in France and taught at the University of 
Poitier, University of Paris – Nanterre and at the Sorbonne. Among his most influential 
works are: Existence and Existents (1947), Time and the Other (1947), Totality and 
Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than being, or, Beyond essence (1974). 
 
c) Charles Taylor – Short Biography 
(1931) 
Canadian political philosopher. Born in Montreal, Quebec in 1931. Taylor is 
known for his communitarian beliefs, which emphasize the importance of ties and moral 
obligations between individuals in a community. In the 1960’s he ran as a candidate of 
the New Democratic Party in Canadian federal elections. Taylor is currently professor 
emeritus at McGill University in Montreal. Author of a number of books on the topics of 
ethics, multiculturalism and philosophical ideas: Hegel (1975), Sources of the Self: The 
Making of Modern Identity (1989), The Malaise of Modernity (1992), Philosophical 
Arguments (1995), A Secular Age (2007), and others. 
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